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T he political debate in Catalonia has been dominated by the issue of political independence in the last few years. The debate on whether Catalonia can (or should) seek statehood has largely 
been focused on domestic politics. Conversations have ranged from 
identifying the drivers of the pro-independence movement, analysing the 
attempts of the Catalan government to hold a referendum and declare 
independence unilaterally, as well as examining the responses from the 
Rajoy executive and other state institutions. In the absence of a binding 
referendum and an informative campaign, Catalan citizens have not 
been able to collectively discuss the advantages and disadvantages of 
leaving Spain vis-à-vis the status quo.
CIDOB has taken the step of participating in the public debate on 
“secession and counter-secession” with a contribution from the field of 
International Relations (IR). Not only because the tools of IR are natural 
to our think tank but also due to the fact that the external dimension 
has been the most neglected in Catalan and Spanish debates. It is 
important to note, however, that the role of CIDOB as an autonomous 
institution is not to take a political stance on domestic politics or advise 
elected officials on what to do each step of the way. CIDOB’s mission is 
to inform the citizenry of ongoing debates and issues in international 
affairs as well as providing the public institutions that make up our Board 
of Patrons with the evidence they need to make informed decisions. 
When requested, we have provided expert advice and will continue 
to do so in the future. But it is worth noting that CIDOB has not been 
consulted as much as it might have been by the Board of Patrons on 
this issue. In spite of this and in honour of intellectual independence, we 
wanted to make a contribution to the debate.
Secessionist and counter-secessionist actors often clash about the 
“internal legitimacy” of their demands but sometimes neglect the 
“external legitimacy” in the form of international recognition. When it 
comes to constituting sovereign statehood, aspiring states need to pay 
significant attention to the calculations of interest-driven great powers. 
Noticeably, the states that matter most for supporting and/or opposing 
state birth are three permanent members of the UN Security Council: the 
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US, France and the United Kingdom. In addition, secessionist movements 
within Europe face a different environment to those movements outside 
the EU, especially when it comes to international recognition. It is worth 
highlighting the Prodi doctrine which states that any territory that breaks 
away from an EU member state would be outside the union and would 
need to re-apply for membership – a process that normally takes many 
years, even in the absence of vetoes from member countries. In the case 
of a Catalan unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), a veto from 
Spain would be likely as well as opposition from other member states 
that may want to discourage claims to self-determination in their own 
territories.
Against this backdrop, the goals of this book are to provide high-quality 
analysis that is neither normative nor prescriptive as well as providing 
a comparative overview of both secessionist and counter-secessionist 
movements from the point of view of International Relations. Last 
but not least, I want to personally thank the authors for sharing their 
expertise and to Diego Muro and Eckart Woertz for co-editing this 
outstanding book on secession and counter-secession. The volume is 
testimony to the need to pay attention to the international system as 
a community of states and, more specifically, the opportunities and 
constraints offered by the European Union in the 21st century. 
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I n 1945, there were 74 independent countries. Today there are 195.
1 
The breakup of colonial empires, the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
and various secessions all over the world have led to the creation 
of numerous new sovereign states since World War II. Historically, the 
expansion and contraction of states has resulted from the competition 
between two living forces: secessionism and counter-secessionism. 
Secession is the “detachment of a territory from an existing state with 
the aim of creating a new state on the detached territory” (Pavkovic & 
Radan, 2011). By contrast, counter-secession could be defined as an 
attempt to prevent the break-up of states as well as their recognition 
by other states at the international level. Movements of secession and 
counter-secession compete and frequently clash over the formation 
of new states and one of the goals of this book is to understand the 
strategies of actors in favour of changing political borders as well as the 
reactions of those who want to prevent the break-up of states.
Secession has been examined at length in the field of political theory, 
comparative politics, history and law but it has been little studied 
by scholars of International Relations (IR). The rise in the number 
of independent nations has driven social scientists to identify the 
domestic drivers of ethno-national mobilisation, the cross-national 
determinants of secession and the political and economic roots of 
separatist movements. With regard to its consequences, the scholarly 
literature has also considered the political dynamics that follow an 
unsuccessful attempt to create a new state entity: regional separatism, 
ethnic conflict, and various centrifugal forces. To put it differently, most 
research on separatism has focused on examining how secessionist 
movements make a moral argument for the creation of new states or 
how states react to the potential break-up of their sovereignty. With 
a few notable exceptions, the field of IR has not studied the creation 
of new polities and their international recognition as sovereign states 
(Coggins, 2011; Ker-Lindsay, 2012; Cunningham, 2014; Griffiths, 2016).
The origin of this volume was a conference on “Secessionism and 
Counter-secessionism: An International Relations Perspective” held at 
the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) on October 5th–6th 
1. As of September 2017, the 
United Nations has 193 full 
members plus two observer 
states: the Vatican City and 
Palestine. Taiwan and Kosovo 
are not UN members, nor are 
the unrecognised states of 
North Cyprus, South Ossetia, 
Abkhazia, Crimea, Somaliland 
and Bougainville, among oth-
ers.
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2017. The two-day conference was widely attended by public policy 
experts but also by a variety of local stakeholders interested in secession: 
from academics and think-tankers to politicians, elected officials and 
diplomats. The conference attracted considerable media attention and 
public interest, most probably because there was intense discussion 
during 2017 about the unilateral attempt by Catalan nationalists to 
disassociate themselves from Spain, reject the latter’s political and legal 
authority and create a new sovereign state. Although the failed Catalan 
effort was mentioned recurrently during the debates at CIDOB, the 
main contribution of the conference was to promote an integrated 
approach to state birth and state death that combined approaches from 
comparative politics and International Relations. One of the take-home 
points of the conference was that the proliferation of states since 1945 
can only be understood as a two-level game, where movements in 
favour of independence (and actors in favour of the status quo) compete 
for support at the domestic level while opposing each other for foreign 
sympathies and international recognition at the global level. 
Volume structure
The trend towards state proliferation that has characterised the past 
few decades has led scholars to conclude that we are living in “an age 
of secession” (Griffiths, 2016). In order to understand the phenomenon 
of secession, this book is structured into three main sections devoted 
to: (1) the international system; (2) the demands of those in favour of 
independence; and (3) the strategic response from those who want to 
preserve territorial integrity.
The first section on the international system and the European Union is 
devoted to examining the opportunities and constraints for frontier-altering 
provided by the current international order. Diego Muro argues that 
there is no legal right, under international or domestic law, to secession. 
Those wanting to secede and form an independent country lack clear 
guidance for sorting out which nations merit statehood and which do 
not. He examines the theory and the practice of secession and counter-
secession and concludes that, ultimately, the success of pro-independence 
movements depends on realpolitik, not ideals. Bridget Coggins analyses 
how states respond to secession and examines the main dynamics of 
state recognition. In order for any new country to gain membership of 
the international community the new state must secure the recognition 
of an overwhelming majority of states, especially the most powerful and 
influential among them. Matt Qvortrup analyses the factors conducive 
to recognising independence referendums. Ultimately it is not referendums 
or public opinion that counts, but international recognition, especially by 
the three Western powers of the UN Security Council: the USA, UK and 
France. The espousal of lofty legal, democratic and philosophical principles 
means very little when it comes to recognising new states. Finally, Bruno 
Coppieters examines the EU policies of engagement with “contested 
states”, which are polities that have de facto control of their territory but 
are not universally recognised as states. He argues that there is no single 
EU strategy towards states that lack diplomatic recognition, but a variety of 
individual policies as seen in the cases of Montenegro and Kosovo. The EU 
does not have the competences to recognise new states because this is the 
exclusive responsibility of member states.
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The second section on case studies focuses on the ways four secessionist 
movements have pursued their ambitions for independence. Nicola 
McEwen provides an overview of the process that led to and legitimised 
the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. She also discusses some 
of the similarities between Scotland and Catalan nationalism, especially 
in the type of polity the advocates of independence are seeking and the 
institutional barriers in the way of achieving these goals. Bart Maddens 
assesses the strength of separatism in Flanders and discusses both the 
discursive and the practical strategies Flemish nationalists have developed 
against Belgium, with a special focus on the role of the EU in these 
strategies. He also provides a brief summary of the current political 
situation and its possible implications. André Lecours argues that 
Quebec is exceptional among all cases of nationalist movements in liberal 
democracies, because governments formed by the secessionist Parti 
Québécois (PQ) have organised two independence referendums. Thus, 
the Quebec case offers particularly fertile ground for examining how a 
secessionist party seeks to convince voters to support independence in a 
referendum campaign while a host of other actors (within the province, 
across the country, and around the world) make a case against secession. 
Gestur Hovgaard explores the case of Greenland and the Faroe Islands 
within the Danish Realm. The chapter provides an introduction to the 
historical background and the formal relationship between the two 
jurisdictions and their metropolitan state. It also extends the two cases 
with an analysis of how increased internal autonomy has evolved in a 
dynamic interaction with changes in international affairs. 
The third and final section focuses on counter-secessionist strategies and 
the way states facing movements of secession respond to such challenges. 
James Ker-Lindsay examines in depth the case of Cyprus during the 
course of the last thirty years, where the Cypriot government has been 
engaged in a relentless battle to prevent the “Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (TNRC)” (or Northern Cyprus, as it is more commonly known), from 
gaining international recognition. Ker-Lindsay argues that any successful 
counter-secession strategy is based on four separate but interlocking 
strands: (1) maintain claim to territory; (2) prevent recognition; (3) stop 
legitimisation; and (4) pursue legal avenues. Ryan Griffiths discusses the 
reasons why governments deny secession in some cases but not others. He 
sustains that states and the international community are prepared to permit 
secession under certain circumstances and the chapter outlines those 
circumstances by describing three interrelated factors: the international 
recognition regime; the calculus of state response; and the resulting 
strategy of secession. Eckart Woertz discusses the role of economic 
arguments over sovereignty disputes. Woertz argues that debates about 
secession and counter-secession often circle around questions of identity, 
political history and legal rights. Yet economic grievances and perceived 
opportunities are as important, if not more so, in secession and counter-
secession strategies. His paper provides a comparative overview of 
economic costs and opportunities for pro-independence movements. 
Roland Sturm focuses on the case of the federal system of Germany and 
how it has managed to rein in secessionist aspirations in Bavaria. The paper 
tries to answer the following research question: Why did the strong sense 
of Bavarian exceptionalism not transmute into secessionism? To explain 
the paradox of efficient regional identity politics in a non-secessionist 
environment Sturm discusses both the key roles of the Bavaria Party (BP) 
and the Christian Social Union (CSU).
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Violent to peaceful means
State formation is inextricably linked to war making and the establishment 
of an economic base to fund it, as the historical record suggests. Nobody 
put it more succinctly than Charles Tilly when arguing that “war made 
the state and the state made war” (Tilly 1990). However, as more and 
more populations were brought together under the political authority of 
the post-medieval state and boundaries became solidified, there was a 
surprising decline of socially sanctioned forms of violence. This might not 
be common wisdom, given the large number of barbaric acts of violence 
reported daily in the mass media but, on the whole, modernity brought an 
unforeseen decline in organised violence. The Harvard psychologist Steven 
Pinker has claimed that violence has been in decline for long stretches 
of time and that we are probably living in the most peaceful time in our 
human existence (Pinker, 2011). Similar arguments were put forward by the 
German sociologist Norbert Elias, who argued that the overall diminution 
of violence was a central feature of the 20th century compared to the life 
and times of our forebears (Elias, 1996)
Needless to say, the decline of organised violence in the last few centuries 
has not been homogenously distributed and unspeakable human brutality 
continues to affect some regions more than others. But the key fact about 
the worldwide decline of violence remains true. Since 1945, there has 
been a steep drop in the number of interstate wars, deadly ethnic riots and 
military coups. Various explanations can account for this decline of violence 
but one of the most persuasive explanations is of a Hobbesian nature, and 
sustains that the reduction of violence goes hand in hand with the rise 
of the bureaucratic centralised state, which claims the legitimate use of 
violence. The argument about the effectiveness of the Westphalian state 
system in reducing violence can account for variation in a large number 
of cases and also works in reverse. Whereas strong states prevent internal 
violence, and polities which are economically interdependent avoid going 
to war, weak states that lack the capabilities to fully control their territory 
experience unrest, which explains why much of today’s violent conflict 
occurs in failed states or zones of anarchy where the dominant actor is 
weak.
The decline of violence and the rise of alternative means to channel 
disputes does not necessarily mean that, as John Lennon hoped, “the 
world will live as one”. As a matter of fact, the prominence of ethnicity 
and nationalism in war escalated during the second half of the 20th century 
and peaked during the 1990s. Scholarly estimates put the share of civil 
wars driven by secessionism at roughly 52% (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). 
Andreas Wimmer has further argued that the share of nationalist wars of 
secession and ethnic civil wars rose from 25% to 75% over the course of 
the 20th century (Wimmer, 2012: 27). By the year 2000, over three-quarters 
of violent conflicts were fought either by groups seeking to establish a 
separate nation-state or to change the ethnic balance of power within 
an existing state. Nowadays, ethno-national wars for independence are 
commonly considered to be the main threat to international peace and 
regional security in the post-Cold War period (Marshall and Gurr, 2003). 
Secessionist crises in which parties hold incompatible goals will continue to 
unfold in the future but these conflicts will increasingly adopt a peaceful 
form, particularly in the liberal democratic settings this book focuses on. 
15 
DIEGO MURO AND ECKART WOERTZ
2017
The strategic abandonment of violence is conceivably explained by the 
fact that non-violent methods have proven to have a superior effectiveness 
(Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Movements for self-determination and 
political independence are part of this trend, possibly because of reduced 
fears of territorial conquest by economically interdependent states. Other 
conflict management tools available to accommodate territorial disputes 
include decentralisation, the celebration of binding referenda or, when 
none of these options has worked, either partition or secession. All in 
all, ethnic and national conflict is increasingly managed by non-violent 
means, at least in the West. This is not to say, of course, that the political 
conflict over sovereignty will be kind and pleasant, for there is no historical 
precedent for nation-states willingly relinquishing territory.
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W hether seen as state-making or state-breaking, the obvious ingredient of secession is politics. Only those holding positions of governance are able to redraw maps and make choices 
that affect state boundaries and human communities. Political theorists 
have attempted to produce coherent models of secession which identify 
when and where secession is permissible and justifiable (e.g., Allen 
Buchanan’s distinction between “primary right theories” and “just cause 
theories”) but the truth is that the theory and the practice of secession 
do not go hand in hand. The practical implication of this disconnect 
between abstract thinking and realpolitik is that constitutionalism, 
international public law, and political theory provide a piecemeal 
assessment of the decisions of those with power. Instead, comparative 
politics and international relations can be more useful in illuminating the 
multiple arenas where movements of secession and counter-secession 
compete for power, legitimacy and advantage
A large number of unwritten rules exist, but there is no clear guidance 
for those wanting to secede and form an independent country. The main 
problem is, of course, that there is no legal right, under international 
or domestic law, to secession. The cases of decolonisation or foreign 
subjugation are often seen as exceptions, and not downsizing models 
that can be applied in a variety of contexts (either autocratic or 
democratic). Examples of non-colonial nations that have successfully 
seceded are scarce and include South Sudan, Eritrea, East Timor, and 
Montenegro (Seymour, 2017: 823). In the absence of a Secessionist’s 
Handbook, Secession for Dummies or a Manual of Secessionists, those 
in favour of political independence either learn by doing or emulate the 
examples of other movements for independence. 
This chapter on strategies examines who gets what, when, and how in a 
secessionist crisis over territory. Unfolding in three parts, it examines the 
arguments that secessionists and counter-secessionists use to mobilise 
their support base, distinguishes between negotiated and unilateral 
cases of secession and, finally, emphasises the need of international 
recognition for effective statehood.
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The arguments of secession and counter-seces-
sion
In the absence of clear rules, secessionist movements put together the 
best story possible in order to mobilise their supporters, convince the 
host state and persuade the international community of the validity 
of their goals. Besides having compelling arguments about norms, 
instruments and principles, secessionists ultimately desire external 
legitimacy in the form of international recognition. The objective of 
providing an effective narrative is to defend the reasonableness of 
secession according to a particular logic or justification whereas the 
long-term goal is to gain legitimacy, which is the normative belief held 
by an actor that a claim ought to be accepted. And how do secessionist 
movements gain legitimacy?
Secessionists often portray their cause as a just one, combatting 
some form of national injustice. The alleged grievance does not affect 
individuals or specific strata within society but a whole ethnic or national 
group. This collective grievance can take the form of a violation of 
human rights, annexation of territories, systematic violations of charters 
of autonomy or economic inequality (Sambanis & Milanovic, 2011). 
The key point here is that the perpetrator and the victim are clearly 
identified along national lines in an attempt to reinforce a distinct sense 
of identity and increase the likelihood that the discontented minority 
will seek independent statehood in the future. Thus, a problem of 
injustice is encrusted in a problem of representation in order to justify a 
secessionist response, which is designed to fix a “national problem” with 
a “national solution”. The force of these cries for justice lies in the fact 
that it justifies collective mobilisation in accordance with ethno-national 
distinctiveness and pushes for secession by appealing to both individual 
reasons and collective identity.
The second key argument of those in favour of political independence 
is to present the movement for self-determination as a democratic 
movement, especially amongst the Western cases this book focuses 
on. In the absence of clear guidelines in international law about how 
to proceed, separatists invoke general liberal principles and emphasise 
how the social movements they lead abide by the “correct” or “right” 
procedures of democratic systems. Secessionists showcase their 
democratic credentials and invoke legal norms, elections, and referenda 
to portray their cause as a collective struggle for democracy and human 
rights first, and not only for national self-determination. Democratic 
tools can also be used hypocritically, as in the case of the controversial 
referendum on the status of Crimea in 2014, where 95% of voters 
decided to join the Russian Federation shortly after a Russian military 
takeover of the peninsula.
By contrast, counter-secessionists put forward arguments about 
“legality” and “stability”. States, for example, argue that existing 
constitutional and international norms allow the legal status quo to 
provide peace and prosperity. In their eyes, the secessionist challenges 
only cause unnecessary constitutional stress, domestic destabilisation 
and intra-group division. The collapse of the legal order, they argue, 
can only lead to further state fragmentation and a more anarchical 
society, and that is why the right to self-determination needs to be 
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restricted to truly exceptional cases. In international terms, the principle 
of non-interference conditions external conduct among sovereign states, 
requiring that they not meddle in the domestic affairs of their peers. In 
the EU context, an additional legal requirement is contained in article 
4 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), which obliges the EU to 
respect the territorial integrity of member states and their constitutional 
systems.
Counter-secessionists also refer to stability and the need to preserve 
the domestic and international order. The overwhelming majority of 
the world’s states are heterogeneous, multi-ethnic or multi-national 
and the indiscriminate application of the principle of self-determination 
could result in an anarchical international system where state break-
up becomes the norm. Defenders of the status quo might be right to 
worry about destabilisation because, as Kathleen Cunningham has 
demonstrated, there is a spatial diffusion of self-determination. She 
claims that “the onset of claims over self-determination in a state’s 
neighbourhood in the previous years increases the chance of claims 
beginning in a country in any given year. Self-determination appears to 
be contagious” (Cunningham 2017: 17). In ordinary terms, a secession 
crisis arises when a section of the polity purports to reject the established 
constitutional order and to establish itself as sole political and legal 
authority over defined territory. States argue that the principle of 
“territorial integrity” prevents other nation-states from supporting 
secessionist movements or promoting border changes in other nation-
states. Last but not least, counter-secessionists also tend to highlight the 
dangers of potential violence, transaction costs, forthcoming poverty, or 
the inefficiency of being a small state as additional causes of regional 
destabilisation.
Actors locked in a secessionist standoff use arguments that range from 
scare tactics to promising a prosperous future in order to gain supporters 
and mobilise their support base (Hechter, 1992). But regardless of the 
arguments floated around, a secession crisis is quintessentially a situation 
of national and international disorder which can only be resolved 
unilaterally or by negotiation.
Secession: Negotiated or unilateral
Secession can be consensual or contested. Consensual secession requires 
an agreement with the host state and is a process that is characterised 
by little or no violence. Often cited examples include the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia in 1993, also known as the “velvet divorce” because of 
its bloodless split, or the case of Canada, which authorised Quebec to 
hold two referendums on independence but also regulated the means by 
which secession would be negotiated (Clarity Act of 2000). Consensual 
secession is largely seen as a matter of law and requires acknowledging 
the constitutionality of secession. For instance, an agreement between 
the Scottish government and the United Kingdom government made 
possible the 2014 referendum on whether Scotland would become 
independent from the rest of the country. If the host state finally 
agrees to a negotiated secession, the international community will also 
recognise the new state, mainly because the aspiring state is more likely 
to be both sovereign and viable. 
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A “unilateral declaration of independence” (“UDI”) is the alternative to a 
negotiated secession. Unilateral secessions are often associated with remedial 
right theories which invoke the rights of nations for unilateral secession in 
cases of serious violations of human rights, unjust annexation of territories, 
and systematic violations of agreements on self-government. Examples of 
UDIs abound, including the American Declaration of Independence, the 
Confederate States of America, the 1965 Rhodesian de facto UDI from 
the United Kingdom, the 1970 secession of East Pakistan (Bangladesh), 
and the abortive secessionist movements in the Congolese Katanga region 
and in the Nigerian Biafra UDI (Haljan, 2014: 9–10). On the whole, UDIs 
such as the Catalan declaration of independence of October 2017 are 
unsuccessful because they are perceived as dangerous precedents for 
secessionist movements worldwide which can imperil the international order.
Secession by UDI is a form of revolution and it is often preceded by 
disorder, characterised by political tension and social conflict. The 
political act of separating polities, or taking steps to initiate separation, 
carries with it significant collateral social and economic upset, adding 
to and spurring the very real risk of substantial violent and nonviolent 
civil disobedience. It stands to reason that any attempt to divide a state 
without absolute or substantial consensus among all political interests 
will surely invite every possible objection and destruction – even military 
responses – as a means of subduing the threat to the state’s continued 
existence as whole. See the examples to date of the supposed UDIs in 
Nigeria, East Pakistan, Ethiopia and Yugoslavia (Haljan, 2014).
Ultimately, a secession crisis originates in an imbalance between the 
rule of law and popular sovereignty. That is, a minority group asserts 
the supremacy or priority of their specific common will and interests 
over the wider interests of society, as embodied in the laws and politics 
of that state. The latter (or so the group argues) dilute or hinder the 
realisation of the legitimate aspirations of the ethnic or national group. 
The imbalance or disjunction between popular sovereignty and the rule 
of law opposes the legitimacy of the group’s will and interest to the 
validity of the existing legal order. By virtue of this normative superiority 
the group may ignore, reject or supplant existing constitutional norms 
otherwise binding and effective. They simply assume the higher value of 
their secessionist aspirations and decide that existing laws do not apply 
to them any longer. Thus, we come to a secession crisis.
Regardless of whether secession is consensual or not, the new polity 
can only join the international community if other states recognise 
it as a sovereign state. External recognition constitutes the ticket to 
membership of the international system, where new entities can enjoy 
the status and material advantages reserved exclusively for states. 
Without that external recognition and legitimacy, an actor is not a state 
(Coggins, 2014: 215).
International recognition 
Whether secession is negotiated or unilateral, sovereignty is inevitably 
constituted through collective recognition. Great powers and regional 
powers are often central to acknowledging the supreme authority of 
a state over a political body. Given the need for external legitimacy, 
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secessionists need to convince both domestic and international 
audiences of the need for a new state by resorting to normative 
and practical appeals. The support of very powerful states is crucial 
when it comes to formal diplomatic recognition and statehood will 
not happen unless others are willing to support them. For example, 
East Timor (invaded by Indonesia) received very little international 
support but, over time, the human right abuses pushed great powers 
to change their minds. Convincing the outside world that Indonesia was 
authoritarian and repressive was a key step towards getting that cascade 
of recognition. The key strategy had been to define a national problem 
that could only be practically resolved with independent statehood.
And when are aspiring states internationally recognised? The truth is 
that realpolitik, not ideals, determine the success of pro-independence 
movements. The arguments that allow the secessionist movement to grow 
its support base (e.g., national grievances and democratic character of 
secession) do not guarantee international support from other states that 
inevitably pursue their own national interests (Krasner, 1999). Great powers 
and regional states put greater emphasis on a re-evaluation of their own 
parochial interests when assessing claims to self-determination. In sum, the 
power politics of international recognition essentially boils down to having 
friends in high places, especially the UN Security Council (see the chapters 
by Coggins and Qvortrup in this volume). 
The role of the European Union (EU) in conditioning strategies of 
secession and counter-secession deserves special attention (Closa, 2016). 
At first sight the idea of seceding from an EU member state seems 
to run contrary to the idea of blurring boundaries in an “ever closer 
Union”. The founding fathers of the European communities hoped that 
the creation of a free trade area would inoculate Europeans against 
warmongering and the ills of nationalism. On the contrary, the political 
stability and peace in most of Europe has meant that small nations do 
not fear being invaded by more powerful states. The creation of an 
integrated European economy with a single market and currency that 
guarantees the free movement of goods, capital, services, and people 
has reduced many of the negative economic externalities of being a 
small sovereign state (Alesina & Spolaore, 2003). Due to these incentives, 
a substantial majority of western Europe’s secessionist parties have 
developed arguments that seek to harmonise national sovereignty with 
transferring powers to Brussels. 
As a democratic area of peace and stability, the EU can stimulate 
support for a secessionist challenge, but its accession rules also act 
as a substantial stumbling block for the act of secession. The political 
and economic incentives mentioned above apply only if the newly 
independent entity is an EU member state, but the legal status suggests 
the need for new states to reapply for membership of the Union. The 
so-called “Prodi doctrine”, named after a former Commission president, 
states that any region that breaks away from an EU member will 
automatically leave the European club and have to reapply under the 
usual rules – a lengthy accession process. In sum, being part of the EU 
system provides economic and political incentives for self-rule, but the 
issue of international recognition in the form of EU membership acts as 
a clear disincentive to regions that want to have boundaries of their own 
without the consent of the host state (Muro & Vlaskamp, 2016).
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Conclusion
National self-determination is generally defined as the right of people to 
form their own state. Regrettably, this principle is often difficult to apply 
because there are no clear guidelines for sorting out which discontented 
nations deserve statehood and which do not. In addition, the most 
common state response from the community of states is to resist 
fragmentation in the domestic sphere and withstand a potential cascade 
of secessions at the international level.
The principle that US President Woodrow Wilson put on the 
international agenda in 1918 does not clarify “who” are the people 
and “when” they are entitled to become a sovereign state. Having a 
peaceful vote helps, but it does not solve all the domestic problems 
of “who” counts and “when” people should vote. It is unclear what 
constitutes a majority and whether the rump state should be allowed a 
say on issues of thresholds or minimum turnout. Unfortunately, there is 
no single set of international standards that can effectively guide state 
birth. The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has issued some 
basic principles for those seeking self-rule but their application varies 
considerably from case to case. The picture is further complicated when 
we add the opinion of the host state’s population, who may not be 
willing to surrender authority over a portion of its territory.
There is also the issue of international recognition when applying 
the principle of self-determination. Whereas domestic support for 
independence is a prerequisite, statehood cannot be gained without 
international acceptance. In most successful cases of secession, there 
has been some level of support from great powers sitting in the Security 
Council, the international community, or organisations such as NATO. 
For instance, Kosovo exists, but it is recognised only by half of UN 
members and, more crucially, not by all EU member states, who prioritise 
state interests and avoid establishing precedents. Spain, for example, 
has a specific interest in not establishing a model that may be followed 
by its own internal secessionist movements in the Basque Country or 
Catalonia. 
To conclude, both secessionists and counter-secessionists know that 
self-determination is an ambiguous moral principle which requires 
both internal and external legitimacy. The autonomy to decide one’s 
future helps to make a moral case for self-determination but the 
dismemberment in whole or in part of an extant state does not 
necessarily attract worldwide sympathy. Most states have their own 
secessionist regions and no-one wants to give the impression that 
getting your own country is easy. 
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T he leaders of independence movements often imagine a smooth transition to a new regime and political community. Noting irreconcilable differences with the existing government, they argue 
that they have exhausted the potential remedies to their grievances 
within the normal political system. Convinced that justice and self-
determination are best served by creating a newly independent country 
whose political boundaries align with those of their nation, they assert 
that a popular referendum or a more representative regional body’s 
vote will vindicate their claim to authority and convince the rest of 
the country to concede. In recent years, a so-called “velvet divorce”, 
similar to Czechoslovakia’s disintegration, approximates their ideal 
scenario. Unfortunately, the reality facing these movements is rarely so 
straightforward, uncontested, non-violent, or contained.
In secession, difficult matters of democracy and political community are at 
stake.1 Is a referendum on independence that includes only those within 
the territory hoping to secede truly democratic? Why shouldn’t the rest 
of the country be invited to decide whether its political community is 
irreparably broken? How should the choice be put before the population? 
Is it true that the secessionist minority has been without the opportunity 
to exercise greater self-governance? Are other, similar groups afforded 
greater or fewer special rights, more or less autonomy? What is the bar for 
a remedial right to independence? How extreme must the government’s 
oppression be? Or does democracy’s purest form require letting go of 
any regional sub-group that does not wish to remain? Should there be a 
waiting period or viability test attendant to an independence demand? 
What if the region’s independence imperils the economy or security of 
those remaining behind or that of its neighbours? None of these questions 
have easy answers. This is, in part, why so few countries have established 
a right of secession or outlined its procedures as a matter of domestic law.
Most governments will not consider secession, or even referendums 
on independence, unless they are legally bound to do so.2 Today, 
only around a dozen countries (out of approximately 194) have a 
potential legal means to secession – at least for particular groups, 
peoples, or regions.3 Most have “constitutionalised” secession this way 
1. Just a couple of terrific, comprehen-
sive volumes engaging with these 
normative and political questions 
include Stephen Macedo and Allen 
Buchanan’s 2003 edited volume, 
Secession and Self-Determination 
and Aleksandar Pavkovic and Peter 
Radan’s 2011 edited volume The 
Ashgate Research Companion to 
Secession.
2. The Canadian government, in 
response to the provincial referen-
dum on Quebecois independence 
in October 1995, is believed to 
be the first democratic country 
to test the legal terms of its own 
dissolution in advance. http://www.
nytimes.com/1998/08/21/world/
canadian-court-rules-quebec-can-
not-secede-on-its-own.html.  
3. Not all have formally legalised seces-
sion by making it a part of their 
countries’ constitutions. Some have 
agreed to it as a matter of law as a 
result of post-war bargains or made 
informal arrangements with parti-
cular separatist groups. For a list of 
laws within constitutions see https://
www.constituteproject.org.
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as a response to the country’s history of violent subjugation of particular 
groups, providing them with an exit clause as a security guarantee to 
assure their continued allegiance to the polity. In those places where a 
clear, constitutionalised right to independence exists, the standard for 
popular support is set high. For example, the Ukrainian constitution’s 
Article 73 requires that all alterations to its territory be resolved by 
an “all-Ukrainian referendum”.4 In another handful of cases where 
governments have been willing to entertain non-binding votes on 
independence, the ultimate process by which secession might occur 
often remains unspecified. Emblematically, the Canadian Supreme 
Court ruled in 1998 that a “clear majority” on a “clear question” was 
prerequisite to the rest of Canada’s sincere consideration of Quebec’s 
independence. The government has not provided explicit standards or 
steps by which the province’s ultimate independence might be won.5 In 
still other countries, rights to independence on paper either cannot be 
meaningfully realised in practice, as was the case in the former Soviet 
Union, or they are outlawed entirely, as is the case for Taiwan in the 
People’s Republic of China.6
It is normatively sub-optimal if only those countries with legal permission 
have the potential to win external legitimacy and new statehood. Those 
countries most willing to allow their citizens to vote on independence 
and ultimately permit it are those where secession as a remedy to 
truly abhorrent governance is hardly necessary. The nations that could 
successfully pursue independence would be restricted to those who, 
globally speaking, do not need it (at least insofar as their basic national 
survival and popular health and well-being are concerned). But in any 
case, even the vast majority of law-bound, democratic countries have 
no such laws. Encouragingly, in the absence of domestic law, when a 
solution short of independence or an amicable divorce can be negotiated 
between secessionists and their government, the international 
community rarely objects.7 
When secessionist challenges cannot be handled peacefully within 
the contested state, they become more complex and the international 
community becomes more influential. This is the modal secession in the 
20th century. For many countries, the potential loss of people, territory, 
resources, status, or other advantages coincident with independence 
makes it an unfathomable political outcome. Leaders deem their 
territories to be indivisible, contest independence, and routinely repress 
secessionists and the wider population from which their support is 
drawn. 
In order for any new country to gain membership of the international 
community – every secessionist movement’s ultimate goal – it must 
secure the recognition of an overwhelming majority of its peers and, 
especially, the powerful and influential among them.8 But international 
law is largely silent when it comes to secession when new independence 
does not concern former colonial or non-self-governing territories.9 As a 
result, the existing members of the international community are without 
legal guidance about whether and when to grant formal recognition to 
a new peer (and revoke it from the embattled government) in contested 
cases. They must use other logics and norms and somehow coordinate 
their responses in order to minimise disruption among the members of 
the wider international community.10 
4. Constitution of Ukraine (1996) 
https://www.constituteproject.org/
constitution/Ukraine_2014?lang=en. 
5. Canadian Supreme Court ruling 
(August 20, 1998) https://scc-csc.
lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/
item/1643/index.do.  
6. According to Hu Jintao’s Presidential 
Decree #34, and adopted by the 
Third Session of the Tenth National 
People’s Congress in 2005. The 
Anti-Secession Law also explicitly 
threatens “non-peaceful means” 
should an independence demand 
be made. The full text of the law 
can be found at the PRC’s American 
Embassy website here: http://
www.china-embassy.org/eng/
zt/999999999/t187406.htm. It is 
also generally agreed that a state’s 
unilateral secession from the United 
States is illegal due to legal prece-
dents including the US Supreme 
Court’s decision in Texas v. White, 
74 U.S. 700 (1869).
7. Though rare, this did occur when 
South Africa attempted to create 
“independence” for its Bantu 
homelands under the apartheid sys-
tem. No countries other than South 
Africa recognised them as legitimate 
states.
8. The strongest states in the interna-
tional system, currently the United 
States, United Kingdom, France, 
China, and Russia, are bellwethers 
of the community norms and serve 
as focal points around which other 
countries can coordinate their 
recognition. These countries’ insti-
tutional role as permanent members 
of the United Nations Security 
Council makes them particularly 
influential.
9. For the United Nations list of current 
and previous non-self-governing 
territories see: http://www.un.org/
en/decolonization/nonselfgovterrito-
ries.shtml.
10. Territories with overlapping claims 
to sovereignty including Kashmir 
and Palestine have been historical 
flashpoints for international wars. 
And everything from high finance 
to physical border crossings is made 
more difficult when sovereign 
authority is ambiguous.
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Given this conundrum, it might be surprising that new countries emerge 
following unilateral demands for independence at all. But in fact, 
between 1931 and 2002, approximately two-thirds of those demanding 
independence ultimately achieved it.11 It was not simple, of course. 
Those successes were often hard won, evolving tactically, advancing in 
fits and starts, inspiring large social movements, usually violence, and 
often enduring for years before winning independence. Yet the standard 
for external recognition was also not usually so high that it required full 
de facto control and authority first. Some secessionist movements did 
“win” their independence by fighting a war and decisively defeating 
their governments on the battlefield. More often, though, new 
statehood was won through some combination of domestic violence and 
international politics and persuasion short of full-scale war.12
So what does influence external recognition? First, the intrinsic 
characteristics of the secessionist region often matter to the 
international community. For example, independence is less likely to 
be recognised when the proposed territory crosses the boundaries 
of several countries or when the territory does not already exist as 
an organised territorial unit. It would be more likely that Texas be 
recognised as independent than a disorganised region such as “the 
west coast” in the US case. This is probably because externalising 
internal borders seems to offer the promise of a less disruptive 
break. Unfortunately, this principle, known as uti possidetis, has 
most recently been used when an entire country dissolves into 
its constituent parts, as in the former Soviet Union and former 
Yugoslavia. Additionally, some historical unit characteristics that once 
influenced external support are unlikely to do so in the future. Claims 
to independence along the boundaries of a former colonial unit 
once made recognition more likely, but because formal colonialism is 
unlikely to return, this will not be the case going forward.
International politics are usually a more important determinant of 
external recognition, and better explain recognition’s timing, than do 
unit characteristics. Specifically, when other countries are convinced 
that a new state will improve their lot, then its admission into the 
exclusive international fraternity of states is much more likely. When 
states believe that a new state will weaken their enemies, strengthen 
themselves and their friends, or otherwise generate positive security 
consequences, they will more likely prefer its independence. When 
influential states have their own challengers or potential challengers 
at home, even if they are quite strong, they are unlikely to offer 
their overt support for fear of signalling support for secession to 
their own domestic audience. These considerations have been 
particularly important to Russia and China in recent years. And 
when the strongest states in the system are concerned that their 
peers will ostracise them or otherwise oppose their support for 
any new member, they often defer to the status quo to assure 
international stability. For every potential factor influencing a given 
country’s preference for or against a secessionist movement, the 
critical factor influencing whether membership and legitimacy are 
ultimately granted is coordination among strong states. When they 
align in favour or against a given secessionist movement, their position 
is decisive. Only when the powerful cannot agree do the politics on 
the ground within the contested country decide.
11. Coggins, Bridget. 2011. “Friends 
in High Places: International Politics 
and the Emergence of States 
from Secessionism” International 
Organization. 65:3, 438.
12. Coggins, Bridget. 2014. Power 
Politics and State Formation in the 
Twentieth Century: The Dynamics 
of Recognition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
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Normative arguments about justice, human rights, or self-determination 
are not entirely unimportant, but they matter because the leaders of 
powerful countries think that they ought to. Further, it is practically 
difficult to disentangle whether the United States favours a given 
secessionist movement because it is firmly committed to democratic 
principles of government (norm) or because it is demanding 
independence from a security challenger that happens to be 
authoritarian (interest). On balance, though, outside states’ responses to 
crises of secession have more to do with their own politics than they do 
laws, norms, or the good of the people within the contested country.
In sum, the outcome of any unilateral bid for secession is difficult to 
know with any certainty in advance. But looking to influential states’ 
parochial preferences and their preference alignment vis-à-vis the others 
will usually be instructive. Furthermore, external politics are dynamic. 
Outside states’ interests can change, and with those changes so does the 
potential for recognition. Regimes with different preferences may rise or 
fall. Home governments can and do fall too, changing their relationships 
with the outside world. Secessionist leaders gain and lose support or 
are sometimes replaced, killed, or die during the struggle. This too may 
change a movement’s fortunes as their tactics or strategy change or as 
new relationships across international boundaries are forged. Finally, 
both secessionists and their governments can actively lobby outsiders 
and sometimes do convince them to come around to their way of 
thinking regarding independence. 
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A lmost twenty years ago the American political scientist Stephen Krasner wrote a book entitled Sovereignty. But what was most telling about it was the sub-title, “organised hypocrisy” (Krasner, 
1999). Analysing international relations from a largely realist perspective, 
the scholar broadly concluded that, all things considered, arguments dressed 
up in idealistic rhetoric were manifestations of power politics. References to 
laudable principles tended to fall down when tested against the “national 
interest”.
The argument to be tested in the following is if the recognition of 
independence referendums follows legal principles, democratic norms or 
merely the political interests of the strongest powers. 
Before making this argument it is worth looking at the “official” theory of 
state recognition and the supposed “right” to hold a referendum. 
The legal argument
The black letter law of the “right” to self-determination referendums is, in 
a sense, very simple. In the words of James Crawford, “there is no unilateral 
right to secede based merely on a majority vote of the population of a 
given sub-division or territory” (Crawford, 2006: 417). Those who espouse 
a similar legal positivist approach will further stress that this is consistent 
with the jurisprudence of international counts. Thus in an obiter dicta in the 
Kosovo case Judge Yusuf held that, 
A radically or ethnically distinct group within a state, even if it qualifies as 
a people for the purposes of self-determination, does not have the right 
to unilateral self-determination simply because it wishes to create its own 
separate state (Yusuf, 2010: 1410). 
Thus, the general rule is that referendums have to be held in accordance 
with existing constitutions (such a provision exists in Art 39(3) of the 
Ethiopian constitution but in few other states) or following an agreement 
between the area that seeks secession and the larger state of which it is 
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part (this is what happened in the very different cases of East Timor in 1999, 
South Sudan in 2011, Scotland in 2014, and a fortiori Bougainville 2020 
[Radan, 2012]). Following this logic, it would seem that the referendums in 
both Catalonia and Kurdistan were both illegal and unconstitutional. 
Based on this reasoning the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was well within 
his right to claim that the Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian referendums 
on independence in the spring of 1991 were illegal and that he was the 
guarantor of Pravovoe gosudarstvo – the equivalent of the rule of law in 
Soviet jurisprudence.1 As, respectively, the Iraqi and the Spanish constitutions 
do not allow for independence referendums, the two referendums held in 
these two entities were, ipso facto, unconstitutional.
Yet matters are not that simple. Yes, all other things being equal a country 
only has a right if it follows the rules. However, when a region is part of an 
undemocratic constitutional order matters are a bit more complex. Antonio 
Cassese has argued, 
When the central authorities of a sovereign State persistently refuse to grant 
participatory rights to a religious or racial group, grossly and systematically 
trample upon their fundamental rights, and deny them the possibility of 
reaching a peaceful settlement within the framework of the State structure 
… a group may secede – thus exercising the most radical form of external 
self-determination – once it is clear that all attempts to achieve internal self-
determination have failed or are destined to fail (Cassese, 1995: 119–120). 
As Iraq is not a well-functioning democratic state, it could be argued that 
Kurdistan meets these criteria. Again the comparison with the Soviet Union 
is illustrative. Notwithstanding Gorbachev’s reforms, the USSR was not a 
democratic regime, which consequently provided the Baltic states with a 
justification for holding referendums. 
But, given that Spain is a democratic state, this rule hardly covers 
Catalonia. While the Spanish government arguably acted in a way that 
appeared grossly disproportionate, the legal argument remains the 
same. Catalonia is not currently part of a non-democratic state. Based 
on the situation as it stands now, the referendum was, from a purely 
legal perspective, extra-constitutional. In a legal system under the rule of 
law, the powers of state institutions have to be enumerated in law. The 
basic principle of L’état de Droit is that citizens can do anything unless it 
is expressly prohibited. Public bodies or “emanations of the state” can 
only do things that are expressly allowed. Thus, the latter cannot legally 
speaking take actions that are not prescribed in enabling legislation. To 
pass legislation outside the boundaries of the constitution or enabling 
legislation is the very definition of being ultra vires.
But does the law have to be that inflexible? Not necessarily. In Canada, the 
two referendums held in Quebec in, respectively, 1980 and 1995, were 
not strictly speaking within the powers granted to the provinces by the 
Canadian Constitution (Sen, 2015). 
Technically speaking, the referendums were ultra vires. Yet, the Canadian 
judges, realising that legality ultimately rests on a modicum of legitimacy, 
followed a more pragmatic logic. In the celebrated case, Re Quebec, the 
court was asked the question, “Under the Constitution of Canada, can 
1. Of course, some would say that, 
previously, under the so-called Stalin 
Constitution of 1936, individual 
Soviet states did indeed have 
the right to self-determination 
referendums under Art 48. But this 
provision was dropped from the 
Khrushchev Constitution of 1956. 
Consequently, the Baltic republics 
were in breach.
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the National Assembly, legislature or Government of Quebec effect the 
secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?” 
The court held that while the “secession of Quebec from Canada cannot be 
accomplished…unilaterally”, a referendum itself was not unconstitutional 
but a mechanism of gauging the will of the francophone province. 
Consequently, a referendum, provided it resulted in a “clear majority”, 
“would confer legitimacy on the efforts of the Quebec government” (Re 
Secession of Quebec, 1998: 385). 
In other words, a result in favour of secession would require the rest of 
Canada to negotiate with Quebec. Needless to say, this ruling does not 
apply in Spain. But the Canadian example suggests that other countries’ 
courts have shown a flexibility and appreciation of nuances that is conducive 
to compromises.
These examples would seem to suggest that the international law pertaining 
to independence referendums is clear and simple. Alas, this is very far from 
being the case (for a more general discussion see Sen, 2015: 77ff). 
While governments may confidently cite principles, the practice of 
independence referendums seemingly owes more to national interest than 
to adherence to principles of jurisprudence. For example, the states of 
western Europe readily recognised the secessions of several former Yugoslav 
republics in the early 1990s – although these new states did not adhere to 
the aforementioned legal principles. And yet, in other cases international 
recognition has been less forthcoming even if the countries have seemingly 
followed the established norms.
No state has to date recognised the outcome of Nagorno-Karabakh’s 
referendum in 1991,  in spite of Azerbaijan being very far from a 
democratic state (the country has a Freedom House score of 7 – the 
same as North Korea!) and the greater freedoms enjoyed by the citizens/
inhabitants of the break-away republic. Similarly, no state recognised the 
referendum in Somaliland even though this enclave is considerably more 
democratic, peaceful and respecting of the rule of law than Somalia, 
which at the time of the referendum was an archetypal failed state. For 
all the legal arguments, acceptance of referendum results is ultimately 
a political rather than a legal decision. In other words, are all these 
arguments just examples of the aforementioned “organised hypocrisy”? 
Are states actually recognised if they follow the rules of the game? Or it 
is simply a matter of power politics?
When are referendums on independence 
recognised?
Lawyers are interested in what is – or is not – legal and in accordance with 
more or less rigid rules. Political scientists, by contrast, are interested in what 
actually happens.  
Are there from a political science – or International Relations – point 
of view causes and tendencies associated with the recognition of 
referendum results? Or are independence referendums simply recognised 
when the rules are followed?
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Alternatively, do we now live in a democratic age in which the gold 
standard of legitimacy is popular support? And, if the answer is in the 
affirmative, do independence referendums tend to be recognised when 
secession is supported by a large majority of the new demos on a large 
turnout? Or is it all down to power politics? 
My hypothesis is that the latter is the most important factor. Can we find 
statistical evidence for this?
Statistical analysis 
Since the 1990s there have been 34 successful referendums on 
independence.2 Of these 15 have resulted in the establishment of a new 
state (see: Qvortrup, 2014, for a further discussion). What are the factors 
associated with the establishment of these new states? 
Factors associated with recognition are the legal one “the seceding 
entity was part of a non-democratic state”. But there are also more 
political ones, e.g. a high turnout and a massive yes vote. And then 
there is the factor – which I think is the most important – of whether 
the new state has the support of the international community, or, more 
specifically, the three “democratic” permanent members of the UN 
Security Council.
In the analysis below we have measured some of the factors that statistically 
could be conducive for when states are recognised using what is known as 
a multiple logistic regression analysis. Without going into technical detail, 
this analysis measures the strength of the different given factors behind a 
phenomenon. 
The dependent variable is whether the state was recognised and took up 
a seat in the UN. The independent variables are the official yes vote, the 
turnout, the Freedom House score of the country from which the entity 
sought to secede and lastly a dummy variable for whether there was 
support for secession among the five permanent members of the Security 
Council (in practice the USA, Britain and France).
 
Table 1: Logistic regression: Determinants of recognition of successful 
independence referendums
Variables Model 1
Security Council Dummy 4.258***
-1.778
Freedom House Score -.298
 (.742)
Turnout .100
 (.90)
Yes-Vote .055
 (.065)
Negotiation/Constitutional Provision 1.054
 (2.35)
Constant -15.134
-9.709
R;Squared: .72 (Nagelkerte): .52 N: 38 *: p< .1,  **:  p< .05, *** p< .01
2. This analysis is based on the 
referendums held since the 
breakdown of the Soviet Union. 
Before that date there had been 
relatively few independence 
referendums (only a handful in each 
decade). The first independence 
referendums were held in the 
US Confederate States of Texas, 
Virginia, Tennessee and Arkansas, 
where narrow majorities voted 
for independence in 1861. Other 
independence referendums include 
Norway (1905), Iceland (1944) and 
Malta (1964). For a discussion of 
these referendums see Qvortrup 
(2014) and Sen (2015).
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As the table shows, Security Council support from the three permanent 
Western powers is the key determining factor (statistically significant at 
p<0.01). All the other variables were not statistically significant.
Whether the country is part of a democracy or not (i.e., if the vote was held 
under the rules prescribed by the legal norms) was completely irrelevant. 
Likewise, whether the turnout was high or low did not matter one jot 
when it came to recognising states. Some countries with low turnout 
became independent (e.g., Bosnia), others did not, (e.g. Tartarstan). 
Whether the support (the yes vote) was high or low was equally 
academic. Indeed, the yes votes in Somaliland (1999) and Krajina (1992) 
were both very high and both countries remain unrecognised.
The factors that determine the success or otherwise of an independence 
referendum are not whether the entity is part of a non-democratic regime, 
or the turnout, but above all if secession is supported by (and in the interest 
of) Britain, France or the USA.
It was not in the interest of these democratic countries to recognise Kurdistan, 
Tartarstan, South Ossetia – or Catalonia. The great democratic powers’ 
arguments for not doing so might be legalistic or even philosophical but the 
statistical evidence suggests that these factors are rarely adhered to in practice; 
ultimately, what matters is the elusive and yet very real “national interest”.
One is tempted to paraphrase Tina Turner and say, “what’s law got to do 
with it?” 
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Appendix: Successful Independence Referendums 1990-2017
Parent Country
Seceding 
Year
Turnout Yes Vote
Entity % %
1
United Socialist Soviet 
Republics (USSR)
Lithuania 1991 91 84
2 USSR Estonia 1991 77 83
3 USSR Latvia 1991 74 88
4 USSR Georgia 1991 98 90
5 USSR Ukraine 1991 70 85
6 Georgia South Ossetia 1991 98 90
7 Georgia Abkhazia 1991 99 58
8 Yugoslavia Croatia 1991 98 83
9 Croatia Serbs 1991 98 83
10 Yugoslavia Macedonia 1991 70 75
11 USSR Armenia 1991 95 90
12 Bosnia Serbs 1991 90 -
13 Serbia Sanjak 1991 96 67
14 Serbia Kosovo 1991 99 87
15 USSR Turkmenistan 1991 94 97
16 USSR Karabakh 1991 99 82
17 USSR Uzbekistan 1991 98 94
18 Macedonia Albanians 1991 99 93
19 Moldova Transnistia 1991 97 78
20 Russia Tartarstan 1992 82 67
21 Yugoslavia Bosnia 1992 99 64
22 Georgia South Ossetia 1992 NA NA
23 Bosnia Krajina 1992 99 64
24 Ethiopia Eritrea 1993 99 98
25 Bosnia Serbs 1993 96 92
27 USA Palau 1993 64 68
28 Georgia Abkhazia 1995 96 52
29 Indonesia East Timor 1999 78 94
30 Somalia Somaliland 2001 99 97
31 Yugoslavia Montenegro 2006 55 86
32 Sudan South Sudan 2011 97 98
33 Iraq Kurdistan 2017 99 72
34 Spain Catalonia 2017 90 42
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C ontested states are the product of partially successful strategies. National independence movements may prove capable of establishing effective control over a certain territory and its 
population, but a lack of full international recognition indicates that 
the counter-secession policies of the government confronted with the 
breakaway have likewise been successful to some extent. This results in 
a fragile equilibrium that the European Union’s security policies need to 
address. In the case of Europe, there is no question of a military solution 
to any of these conflicts, but nor are negotiations making sufficient 
progress to end the stalemate. Among the various cases of unrecognised 
entities the EU is dealing with, one – Northern Cyprus – is located on 
EU territory. The EU is also mediating between a candidate country – 
Serbia – and a potential candidate country – Kosovo, whose statehood 
is contested, including by some EU member states. In addition, the 
EU has to develop a policy towards a number of disputes involving 
contested states in its eastern neighbourhood: these are the conflicts 
over the status of Transnistria in Moldova, South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, and Donbass and Lugansk 
in Ukraine. Russia is deeply involved in this last group through its support 
for these contested states. Moreover the EU also has to deal with entities 
that are located farther away, but that are nonetheless also crucial for 
its global security policies, such as Palestine and Taiwan. The following 
paper will describe some crucial characteristics of the EU’s policies on 
conflicts involving contested states and will analyse some of the main 
problems it is grappling with.
The EU does not initiate policies to address secessionist or irredentist 
movements on the territory of its member states: it becomes active only 
when it can count on the support of the member states in facing such 
conflicts. Then the European Commission can, for instance, develop 
regional policies aimed at conflict transformation, with the goal of 
making the positions of the conflicting parties more compatible. In the 
long term this will allow for more cooperation between them, or even 
joint decision-making. The Commission implemented such a conflict 
transformation policy for Northern Ireland, with the full support of the 
British and Irish governments (Mabry et al., 2013). 
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The EU has, however, adopted a proactive policy in this regard where 
national minorities in candidate countries such as Macedonia and Turkey 
are concerned. And its initiatives are even more prominent in the case 
of contested states, whose formation entails a unilateral declaration of 
independence and generally results from the use of force. The outcome 
of conflicts involving contested states is ultimately decided at the 
international level. For these reasons, all conflicts involving contested 
states directly affect fundamental EU security interests. 
One may wonder if it makes sense to compare the EU’s policies towards 
the different conflicts involving contested states. The fact is, the EU has 
no overall strategy on contested states, merely a series of individual 
policies. States, or international organisations such as the EU, that are 
involved in attempts to solve conflicts on sovereignty do not want to 
present a particular approach or settlement as a general model for 
other cases: this would run counter to the need for flexibility that is 
required for successful mediation. In 2002, as High Representative of the 
European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security, Javier Solana played a 
leading role in brokering an agreement between Serbia and Montenegro 
which allowed for a referendum on independence for Montenegro. 
Such a referendum was held in 2006. Solana defended this clause in 
the agreement, and he also declared that it would not constitute a 
precedent for any other European countries. In his view, those who were 
comparing Montenegro with territorial disputes in Spain were suffering 
from delirium tremens (El Mundo, 2016). Two years later, in 2008, the 
EU member states who had recognised Kosovo likewise stressed that 
their decision did not constitute a precedent – that this was a sui generis 
case, which could not be compared to any other case. The conflicting 
parties have their own reasons to be fearful of comparisons: the risk is 
that the outcome of the dispute they are involved in would be made 
dependent on the outcome of the conflict it is compared with, in which 
case the  comparison might work against them. For all these reasons, 
therefore, a systematic comparison between the various cases could be 
considered problematic from the perspective of a political practitioner. 
Scholars, on the other hand, have no reason to reject comparisons. 
That would be contrary to their trade. A comparison of the EU’s policies 
towards contested states is particularly useful for showing common 
traits, despite the wide diversity of circumstances – and this allows 
for a better understanding of the EU’s capacity to act in such difficult 
circumstances. 
The EU does not have the power to recognise new states: that is the 
exclusive prerogative of its member states. And the member states’ 
policies on recognition are not based on particular national doctrines. 
Recognition is a political act, which is to some degree guided by 
general principles and which also takes into account the interests of 
the recognising states, such as the need for a stable international order. 
In addition, recognition policies take into consideration the particular 
context in which a conflict on secession takes place. In order to preserve 
their diplomatic flexibility, individual EU member states do not formulate 
a clear doctrine on recognition policies, and this is a fortiori true for 
these states taken collectively. 
The practice regarding recognition and non-recognition is thus very 
diverse, but there are still general observations to be made regarding 
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the EU experience. When confronted with the dissolution of the 
Yugoslav federation, the members of the European Communities (EC) 
were united in defending the position that, in principle, all Yugoslav 
republics (the entities with the highest formal status under the Yugoslav 
constitution) had a right to independence (Rich, 1993). This excluded 
a right to independence for provinces, such as Kosovo, that were 
formally subordinated to one of the republics. In the case of the Soviet 
Union, such a right to independence was reserved for Union republics 
– which were sovereign and, according to the constitution, had a right 
to secession. The members of the EC were in full agreement with each 
other when they denied the right to independent statehood to all other 
entities in the Soviet federal framework, such as Autonomous republics 
(Chechnya and Abkhazia) or Autonomous regions (South Ossetia and 
Nagorno-Karabakh). And EC members were likewise unanimous in their 
recognition of the mutually agreed dissolution of the Czechoslovak 
federation into its constituent parts. This means that the EC was able 
to reach full unanimity in the case of the dissolution of these three 
federations into newly independent states.
More problematic, in terms of the unity of EU member states, was 
the application of the so-called “remedial position” on the right to 
secession (Buchanan, 2004). This position considers the redressing of 
historical injustices, such as liberation from oppression or occupation, as 
a legitimate basis for the right to independent statehood. According to 
this position, nations have such a right to independence if this is the only 
reasonable way to correct or prevent such injustices. The members of the 
European Community jointly defended this position in 1991 in relation 
to the restoration of the independence of the Baltic states, which had 
been occupied and annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940. When it 
came to recognising the statehood of Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, however, they jointly refused 
to apply the same normative position. But the vast majority of them did 
recognise Kosovo in line with this remedial position – a decision that was 
then vehemently opposed by other member states, particularly Spain and 
Cyprus.
According to the “choice position” (Wellman, 2010), the population 
of any territory has a right to secede unilaterally if such a choice is 
based on the democratically expressed will of the majority and if it is 
likely to lead to the creation of a state that is based on the rule of law. 
This view of national self-determination finds support among political 
theorists, but far less among international lawyers. It may also count 
on some sympathy in the media and a part of European public opinion 
at large. But it is a position not shared by any EU member state, none 
of which identifies the principle of the self-determination of peoples 
with democratic freedom of choice. According to all EU members, the 
support of the majority of a people for independence is one of the 
necessary conditions for the recognition of a state, but this democratic 
will is far from being a sufficient condition for such recognition. They 
vehemently reject the view that the majority of a population of any 
given territory that is part of a recognised state may decide its future 
international status on its own. The EU therefore refused to recognise 
the legitimacy of a referendum on the independence of Transnistria 
in 2006, and it strongly opposes the holding of a referendum on the 
independence of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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The division between EU member states regarding particular cases of 
recognition reflects the division in the international community as a 
whole. EC members were united on the issue of recognition in cases 
where the other members of the international community were also 
united, as they were in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
At present, the EU member states are likewise divided when the other 
states in the international community are divided, as for instance on the 
recognition of Palestine or Kosovo. Such divisions lessen the efficiency of 
EU policies on conflicts involving contested states, but they do not make 
such policies impossible, as long as the EU is capable of overcoming 
the division between its members by developing a common policy of 
engagement without recognition. The EU is currently coordinating 
engagement policies towards Palestine and Kosovo, for example, and is 
thus able to act in line with its own interests in the disputes on the status 
of these entities. 
And indeed the EU has a vital interest in being engaged in attempts 
at resolving conflicts involving contested states in Europe. It plays the 
leading role in mediating between Kosovo and Serbia. Together with 
the UN and the OSCE, it chairs the Geneva International Discussions 
regarding the conflicts in Georgia over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
It is likewise deeply involved in attempts at resolving the conflicts in 
Ukraine, in several ways. It has an observer role in the OSCE-led talks 
between Moldova and Transnistria, and a supportive role regarding both 
the UN-led negotiations on Cyprus and the negotiations on Nagorno-
Karabakh, which are led by the Minsk Group of the OSCE (Russia, the US 
and France). The EU also has an interest in being present in breakaway 
territories with projects aiming at conflict transformation. This may be 
called a policy of “engagement without recognition” when the EU is 
divided on the question of recognition, and a policy of “engagement 
and non-recognition” when it is united in a refusal to recognise the 
statehood of the breakaway entities.
We have already mentioned the differences between practitioners and 
political scientists when it comes to comparing cases of secessionist 
conflicts in which the EU is involved. This is not the only distinction to 
be made between practical and theoretical perspectives on EU policies 
towards contested states. The term “contested state” itself is used in 
political science to describe the partial or total lack of international 
recognition of political entities in control of a particular territory and 
its population. It further raises the question of whether it is possible 
to consider these entities states on the basis of current definitions of 
statehood, regardless of the lack of recognition. This concept and the 
related political science concept of a “de facto state” are not used by 
the EU. Its diplomats avoid, whenever possible, the term “state” in cases 
where its member states are divided on the question of recognition. They 
also avoid it where they are unanimously in support of counter-secession 
policies aiming at the reintegration of these entities. 
In some cases, EU member states and EU institutions will use terms from 
international law, such as “occupation”, for instance. But, due to its 
legal implications, the use of such a term severely restricts the policy of 
engagement with unrecognised entities. In most cases the Commission 
and the Council (which are directly involved in the implementation 
of conflict transformation programmes in the breakaway territories) 
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will therefore hesitate to use the term – in contrast to the European 
Parliament, which is not confronted to the same extent with the problem 
of legal restrictions in the implementation of its policies. In the case 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, for instance, the term “occupied 
territories” is used by the European Parliament and some EU member 
states, such as Poland and Estonia, but not by the European Commission 
or the Council. Similarly, the European Parliament refers to the territories 
around Nagorno-Karabakh as being occupied, in line with several UN 
Security Council resolutions, but not Nagorno-Karabakh itself. 
The EU policy of engagement without recognition, as adopted 
towards Kosovo, is designed in such a way that it should not have any 
consequences for the recognition of statehood. But those EU member 
states who refuse to recognise the statehood of Kosovo still accept 
the idea that that entity’s political structures should be built up in line 
with democratic standards, with a view to a final settlement in the 
future. In such a case, the EU may thus support a process of state- and 
nation-building, as long as this kind of engagement is status-neutral. 
By contrast, a policy of engagement and non-recognition opposes all 
forms of direct support for state- and nation-building, and promoting 
democracy is then restricted to giving assistance to certain programmes 
run by civil society organisations. In these cases the EU adheres to the 
principle of territorial integrity, and in principle backs the counter-
secession policy of governments confronting a breakaway. This is its 
approach to all the contested states on the territory of the former 
Soviet Union, and also to Cyprus. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh 
it adopts, formally, a more balanced position – taking into account 
its diplomatic relations with Armenia – by referring to the principle 
of national self-determination of peoples as well as to the principle 
of territorial integrity, but in its practical policy here it does not cross 
the red lines set by Azerbaijan by venturing into an active form of 
engagement. 
When it comes to contested states, the EU policies of engagement and 
non-recognition or engagement without recognition are never identical 
to the policies of a central government confronting a breakaway. Its non-
recognition policy towards Taiwan is based on the One China principle, 
but it does not share Beijing’s view on future reunification or its cross-
Strait policies. In the case of Kosovo, the EU has developed its own rules 
for its policy of engagement without recognition, which differ both from 
the practice of EU member states who recognise Kosovo and from the 
practice of member states who oppose such recognition. Similarly, in the 
case of Cyprus, the non-recognition policy of the EU institutions is not 
fully in line with the policy of the Cypriot government. The institutions 
will generally respect the government’s policy, but will also take their 
own initiatives on conflict transformation and may even, in exceptional 
cases, cross the red lines set by Cyprus. 
This thesis can be illustrated by an example. After the failure of the 
UN’s so-called “Annan plan” for the reunification of Cyprus in 2004, 
the EU wanted to facilitate future negotiations by ending the isolation 
of Northern Cyprus. On 29 April 2004, the Council of the European 
Union approved the so-called Green Line Regulation on the movement 
of persons and goods between northern and southern Cyprus. The 
Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce – an institution that had already 
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existed before the division of the island – received authorisation to issue 
the accompanying documents necessary for intra-island trade. This 
happened in agreement with the Greek Cypriot government. But the 
value of this trade remained extremely limited over the ensuing years: 
in 2016 it amounted to around €4–5 million, which is far below the 
minimum it would need in order to have a significant impact on conflict 
transformation. The low level of trade from south to north is largely a 
consequence of the status question: customs duties have to be paid 
on goods that are exported to the north (because the Turkish Cypriots 
regard the border as an international one), and moreover, unlike goods 
exported outside the EU, they are not exempt from VAT (because the 
Greek Cypriots and the EU regard the north as part of EU territory) 
(Mirimanova, 2015). In 2004 there was widespread support within the 
European Union for a trade regulation that would allow goods to be 
exported directly from Northern Cyprus to the EU, but it was vetoed 
by the Greek Cypriot government. The question of direct trade with 
Northern Cyprus returned to the agenda when the Lisbon Treaty entered 
into force in December 2009, as this brought the European Parliament 
into a co-decision procedure in such matters. But the Commission’s 
proposal to allow direct trade failed to receive majority support within 
the European Parliament, as it was felt that such trade liberalisation 
would imply that Northern Cyprus could be considered a separate legal 
entity (Vogel, 2010; Cyprus Mail, 2010). 
This example illustrates the formal and institutional complexities of 
an EU policy of engagement and non-recognition and, furthermore, 
the divisive effects such a policy may have among EU institutions, as 
here between the Commission and the Parliament. Here, the Cypriot 
government managed to mobilise majority support in the European 
Parliament against a direct trade agreement between the EU and 
Northern Cyprus, but the dispute shows that in principle it is very 
possible for a member state to be overruled on matters regarding its 
counter-secession policy.
At the beginning of this article, the conflicts between contested states 
and the states they have broken away from were described in terms 
of partial success: the contested states managed to establish effective 
power, and the central states to prevent their full or even partial 
recognition. These achievements can also be described in terms of 
partial failure: on the one hand, the failure to achieve full recognition, 
and on the other, the failure to recover control over the lost territory. 
The EU’s policy of engagement with contested states can likewise be 
described in terms of both failure and success. The EU member states 
are divided on the issue of recognition and the EU institutions on the 
best kind of engagement with contested states. This means that their 
policies in this regard are less efficient than they could be. Nevertheless, 
the EU and its member states have succeeded in overcoming major 
divisions in even the most difficult cases.
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T here are important and much discussed differences between the independence debate in Scotland and the UK and the crisis currently gripping Catalonia and Spain. The United Kingdom 
is sometimes reified in Catalan discussions on these matters, as if 
the recognition of democratic self-government were somehow part 
of its DNA. Certainly, the response of the UK government to the 
independence challenge from Scotland is a million miles from the 
response of the Spanish government in recent years. But one does 
not need to look too far into the history of the UK to find examples 
of when responses to nationalist challenges – whether within the 
context of a declining empire or on the island of Ireland – were less 
accommodating. This contribution offers a more nuanced view of the 
process that led to and legitimised the 2014 independence referendum. 
It also discusses some of the similarities between Scotland and Catalan 
nationalism, especially in the substance of type of polity the advocates 
of independence are seeking and the institutional barriers in the way 
of achieving these goals. Three themes are discussed in turn: (i) the 
process underpinning the independence referendum in Scotland; (ii) the 
meaning of independence and the territorial objectives largely shared by 
mainstream Scottish and Catalan nationalist leaders; and (iii) the role and 
response of the European Union. 
Process
The most notable contrast between the Scottish and Catalan 
independence movements is in relation to the process, and the 
recognition of the right to decide. In 2011, the SNP surprised many 
by winning an overall majority of seats in the Scottish parliament. 
The SNP had a manifesto commitment to hold an independence 
referendum, but the election result should not be regarded as an 
expression of that desire. Support for independence had consistently 
been around 30% since devolution, and the SNP’s popularity 
and electoral success rested much more on positive evaluations 
of leadership, competence in government and effectiveness in 
representing Scottish interests in the UK relative to its opponents 
INSIGHTS FROM THE SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM
48 
2017
(Johns, et al., 2013). There was also debate about the legal 
authority of the Scottish parliament to legislate for an independence 
referendum. The Scotland Act 1998 – Scotland’s founding statute of 
autonomy – does not recognise the right to decide. The constitution, 
including the Union between Scotland and England, is a matter 
reserved in law to the UK parliament. The Scottish government never 
conceded that it could not hold a consultative referendum, but sought 
to negotiate an agreement with the UK government to put the issue 
of authority beyond legal doubt and legal challenge. 
For its part, following the 2011 election, the UK government 
immediately recognised that the SNP government had a mandate 
to hold an independence referendum, in line with the party’s 
manifesto commitment. While insisting he would “campaign to 
keep our United Kingdom together with every single fibre I have”, 
the prime minister promised that he would not put any legal or 
political obstacles in the way of an independence referendum (The 
Guardian, May 6 2011). Over the course of the next 17 months, 
the UK and Scottish governments negotiated an intergovernmental 
agreement (‘the Edinburgh Agreement’), which paved the way for a 
temporary transfer of power. The resultant section 30 order exempted 
“a referendum on Scottish independence” from the list of reserved 
power in the Scotland Act, but only until the end of 2014. There 
were some conditions, but these were minimal: insistence on a single 
question with only two options; some rules on campaign finance; 
and oversight by the UK Electoral Commission (with the lead role 
taken by its Scottish office), according to the principles of the Political 
Parties, Elections and Referendums Act (2000). Once the power was 
transferred, the Scottish government and the Scottish parliament were 
in charge of the referendum process. 
The Scottish independence referendum in 2014 was not legally binding. 
No referendum in the UK is legally binding. But the consent and the 
participation of the UK government gave the referendum legitimacy 
and it is likely that the result would have been politically binding. The 
Edinburgh Agreement committed both governments to respect the 
outcome of the referendum whatever that may be. There was no 
insistence on a qualified majority; the size of majority would doubtless 
have repercussions for the negotiations that followed, but under the 
terms of the agreement, a simple majority was all that was required 
to kick-start independence negotiations. This was underlined in a joint 
statement – the wording of which was the result of intergovernmental 
negotiations – sent to every household in advance of the referendum. It 
stated: 
“If more people vote ‘Yes’ than vote ‘No’ in the referendum, 
Scotland would become an independent country. This would 
not happen straight away. There would need to be negotiations 
between people representing Scotland and people representing 
the UK.” 
What, then, explains this degree of accommodation, which seems 
remarkable when contrasted with the vehement resistance of the 
Spanish government to the Catalan referendum? One can point to both 
strategic and philosophical explanations. 
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From the vantage point of May 2011, with surveys suggesting that 
support for independence rarely scored above a third of the Scottish 
electorate (see Figure 1), the costs of conceding a referendum seemed 
lower than the risks of fuelling a backlash were a referendum to be 
rejected. In most cases, demands for independence emerge as a result 
of dissatisfaction or grievance with the constitutional status quo, and a 
collective feeling that national identity isn’t recognised and/or national 
interests aren’t protected within the existing state structure. This was 
not the case in Scotland in 2011. On the contrary, support for Scottish 
devolution within the UK was high, and Scots appeared more content 
with the deal that Scotland secured from the Union, especially after the 
SNP was first elected to government in 2007 (Curtice and Ormston, 
2012). The SNP strategy of building confidence in Scottish independence 
by making a success of a more limited form of self-government (while 
attempting to expose its constraints) contributed to increasing the 
level of satisfaction Scottish voters held for devolution. There was no 
grievance, no constitutional court had rejected powers for the Scottish 
parliament. In fact, the parliament’s powers were just about to increase. 
Rejecting the right to decide might have created a grievance around 
which support for independence could be mobilised, and seemed too 
great a risk when the future of the Union seemed secure. 
A referendum that seemed certain to result in a heavy defeat for 
independence also offered an attractive prospect for committed 
unionists. The threat of independence has long acted as political 
leverage for successive Scottish governments, and even at times for 
the Scottish Office before devolution, to enable Scottish representatives 
to lobby for policy, financial or constitutional concessions from the UK 
government. A resounding endorsement of the Union in a referendum 
would serve to weaken the effect of such territorial demands. Conceding 
a referendum therefore presented an opportunity to demonstrate 
what appeared to be a clear majority against independence which 
could fatally undermine the threat of independence for a generation. 
This was, of course, a miscalculation. At 55-45 against independence, 
the referendum vote produced a clear endorsement of the Union. 
However, it was also too close for comfort and helped to generate 
further constitutional change. What is more, it served to boost the SNP’s 
electoral dominance of Scottish politics, and as Figure 1 reveals, support 
for independence – even when voters are confronted with a plurality of 
constitutional options – has remained historically much higher since the 
referendum than it was before it.    
Philosophical explanations also help to account for the degree of 
territorial accommodation evident in the run-up to the 2014 vote. 
Although the UK was a relative latecomer to multi-level government 
– the system of devolved government in Scotland, Wales and its 
restoration in Northern Ireland dates only to 1999 – its plurinational 
character has long been recognised. Political union between Scotland 
and England never eroded the distinctive national identity of the 
component parts. Scotland’s institutional distinctiveness was preserved 
in its churches, legal system, education system and local government. 
These institutions became carriers of national identity even as politics 
became increasingly centralised during the era of mass politics. Thus, 
in the UK, national boundaries overlap: the nation of Britain is made 
up of the nations of England, Scotland and Wales, and together 
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with Northern Ireland they form the UK, which is both nation and 
state. Famously, there is no adjective to describe the citizens of the 
United Kingdom as co-nationals; though “British” is often used, 
especially by one community in the divided territory of Northern 
Ireland, Britain technically excludes the territory of Northern Ireland. 
For much of the period of Union, these national identities have been 
broadly compatible. This was aided by the unwillingness on the part 
of successive UK governments, perhaps borne of a lack of interest or 
lack of perceived need, to suppress the plurinational character of the 
state. Recognition of nations within the state has never posed the 
kind of problem within the UK as it has posed periodically in Spain or 
Canada. This makes it easier philosophically to recognise the right to 
decide because, however unattractive independence may be politically, 
it doesn’t pose the same existential crisis in the UK as it often does for 
other states for whom the boundaries of nation and state are more 
aligned.  
 
Figure 1: Support for Independence (%), 1999–2016
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One must also acknowledge the personal contribution of the then 
prime minister, David Cameron. In this particular referendum (the same 
cannot be said of his role in relation to the Brexit referendum and its 
aftermath), Cameron demonstrated considerable leadership and a 
pragmatic attitude which facilitated intergovernmental negotiation 
and agreement. He was able to combine the recognition of the right 
to decide with a passionate defence of the Union. For an illustrative 
example, in a speech seven months before the referendum, in which 
he was appealing to British citizens across the UK to make their voices 
heard in the campaign, he said: “this is a decision that is squarely and 
solely for those in Scotland to make… I believe passionately that it is in 
their interests to stay in the United Kingdom… but it is their choice, their 
vote” (Cameron, 2014). Notwithstanding the degree of continuity within 
Conservative thinking – even Mrs Thatcher, while being deeply opposed 
to independence, acknowledged in her memoirs Scotland’s “undoubted 
right to national self-determination” – it can’t be assumed that other UK 
leaders would act in the same way. 
Independence was defeated in 2014, but the result was much closer 
than the UK government had anticipated, and it’s not at all certain 
that another UK government and another leader would be quite so 
accommodating if another independence referendum was in sight. 
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Indeed, when the Scottish first minister formally requested a new 
section 30 order to transfer the power to hold another independence 
referendum in light of the material change in circumstances brought 
about by the UK’s decision to leave the European Union (also a 
manifesto commitment), the current prime minister formally rejected 
the offer, with the carefully crafted response that “now is not the time”. 
This translated into more forceful opposition to a new referendum by the 
SNP’s political opponents in the UK general election in June 2017 with 
some success.
Independence, interdependence and secession
The subject of CIDOB’s workshop was secession and counter-
secession. But when discussing European cases, is secession the 
right terminology? It is not a term commonly used by independence 
movements and it arguably doesn’t capture what they aspire to. The 
term “separatism”, so liberally used by commentators in relation to 
the current crisis in Catalonia, is also inadequate. In Scotland, as in 
Catalonia, the independence movement is a broad coalition. Not 
everyone shares the same vision of what independence should entail. 
But within the SNP, which remains the dominant force within the 
Scottish independence movement, the stated goal of independence 
was framed in terms of a new relationship with the rest of the UK. As 
Nicola Sturgeon, then deputy first minister, noted, “far from marking 
a separation from our friends and relations across these islands, 
independence opens the door to a renewed partnership between us” 
(Sturgeon, 2013).
For example, the SNP government’s White Paper on independence 
(Scottish Government, 2013) published in advance of the referendum 
included proposals to:
• set up a formal currency union with the rest of the UK, which would 
see Scotland’s government effectively becoming a shareholder in the 
ownership and governance of the Bank of England; 
• maintain the British Isles Common Travel Area (currently operational 
between the UK and the Republic of Ireland and formally recognised 
in the EU Amsterdam Treaty) to facilitate cross-border travel and avoid 
the need for internal border posts; 
• develop a strategic energy partnership and an integrated energy 
market, as well as an integrated labour market; 
• cooperate in a wide range of public bodies, including keeping the UK 
Research Councils and the Green Investment Bank;
• maintain common regulatory agencies, for example, in rail regulation 
and the Civil Aviation Authority. 
• In defence and security, the emphasis was on new institutions in an 
independent Scotland working in partnership with the rest of the UK.
Independence, then, was presented by its protagonists not as separation 
or even secession but as a new form of partnership (Keating and 
McEwen, 2015). This new partnership was to be overseen by a new 
intergovernmental forum, modelled on the British Irish Council or the 
Nordic Council of Ministers, and – crucially – all within the context of the 
partners’ continued EU membership.  
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This idea of independence as partnership is not unique to the Scottish 
experience. The 2014 White Paper of the Catalan Advisory Council on 
the National Transition likewise envisaged continued political, economic 
and institutional ties with the rest of Spain and the other Iberian 
states, including a treaty underpinning cooperation in: monetary and 
financial policy; industry and trade; agriculture and fisheries; customs 
and tax; health and education; environment, infrastructure, defence, 
law enforcement and migration. Even the Quebec offer in 1995 – 
while arguably the most radical of the three – included an offer of an 
economic and political partnership with the rest of Canada.
These objectives are motivated by a desire to avoid independence being 
viewed as a clean break, a rupture, a leap into the unknown. A vision 
of independence with some continuity is less frightening, less risky, and 
perhaps as a result, more palatable to voters. Such objectives are also 
motivated by pragmatism. Dismantling a 300-year old political union is 
a daunting task. Where services currently operating on a cross-border or 
centralised basis are non-contentious politically, the SNP judged that it made 
more sense to have continuity, freeing up space to focus on disentangling 
the more politically potent areas such as natural resources, the national 
debt or the armed forces. National interdependence alongside the goal 
of independence is not only recognised as a 21st century norm, but has 
also been regarded as desirable. In the global order, no state, big or small, 
exists in splendid isolation. For the mainstream of Europe’s independence 
movements, the era of 20th century sovereign statehood is over.
Of course, not everyone sees independence this way, and especially not its 
opponents. Partnerships only make sense when there is a willing partner. And 
therein lies the problem. It is far from certain that the new offer of partnership 
made by the Scottish government would have been accepted by the UK 
government in the event of a yes vote. Less likely still that it would have led 
to the “partnership of equals” that the SNP had in mind, given the resource 
disparities – economic, bureaucratic, political, and reputational – between an 
independent Scotland and the rest of the UK. Moreover, a partnership of the 
kind envisaged in 2014 would be much more difficult within the context of 
Brexit, since it depended upon both Scotland and the rest of the UK being within 
the European Union.  
Response of the international community and 
the EU
From the perspective of the international community, independence 
debates are domestic affairs. In a formal sense, this suggests that 
international institutions and the leaders of other sovereign states 
often refrain from taking a formal stance, but are passive observers of 
someone else’s debate (or, where they choose to, they may ignore the 
issue entirely). In practice, this often means explicitly or implicitly siding 
with the national government’s bid to maintain the territorial integrity 
of the existing state. This is at least in part motivated by rational self-
interest. Maintaining the constitutional status quo is likely to be less 
disruptive to commercial and political interests, avoids the prospect of 
demonstration effects or spillover for their own territories, and may 
reflect the hope that they in turn would receive support from allies in 
the international community in pursuit of their own territorial objectives 
and the defence of their territorial integrity should it be threatened.
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The position of the European Union merits closer scrutiny. With respect 
to the independence movements of Scotland and Catalonia, the EU is 
not an international observer. When territorial challenges take place 
within the EU’s borders, they do not take place in its own backyard or on 
its doorstep. They take place inside the EU’s house. And yet the EU has 
tried to act as if it were a dispassionate international observer, regarding 
these challenges as internal matters of member states to address in line 
with their own constitution and their own rules of law. 
Certainly, the EU treaties do not provide much clarity or opportunity 
for intervention. Article 4 of the Lisbon Treaty underlines the Union’s 
commitment to respecting the essential state functions of its members, 
“including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law 
and order and safeguarding national security”. There are, however, other 
provisions within the treaty which could arguably be used to intervene 
to protect the European rule of law and the rights of EU citizens where 
these are jeopardised by a member state. In particular, article 2 of the 
treaty underlines the fundamental values of “respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities”. While 
these were not undermined in the Scottish independence referendum, 
there is surely a case to make that they are being undermined in the 
political, governmental and judicial responses to the Catalan referendum 
process and its aftermath. 
As was abundantly clear in the context of the Scottish independence 
referendum, while the treaty has provision for accession and exit from 
the EU, it is silent on the issue of internal enlargement. Intense debate 
and scrutiny among lawyers led to the broad conclusion that, had 
Scotland voted for independence, its membership of the EU would 
probably cease while the UK’s membership would continue, but that 
accession as a member state could likely be negotiated in parallel with 
independence negotiations, especially if the latter were consensual. But 
the silence in the treaties left open the possibility that EU representatives, 
most notably the then Commission president, Jose Manuel Barroso, 
could make frankly ridiculous assertions that it would be “extremely 
difficult, if not impossible” for an independent Scotland to join the EU 
-  despite having enjoyed incorporated membership as part of the UK for 
40 years, having already adopted the acquis within domestic law, and 
already satisfying the terms of membership as a mature democracy with 
respect for fundamental rights.
Of course, strategic and philosophical explanations play their part 
here too. The self-interest that generally lends itself to a desire for 
constitutional stability and support for an ally among the international 
community more broadly is perhaps even more evident among EU 
member states. Their self-interest makes it unlikely that there will be a 
change in the European treaties to provide clarity on the appropriate 
response to secessionist challenges within the EU’s borders, despite 
the fact that such a procedure could offer stability in the face of 
an escalating crisis. Among the EU institutions, meanwhile, there is 
an evident philosophical opposition to independence as somehow 
anathema to the project of European integration. This reflects a 
misunderstanding of the territorial goals of mainstream European 
independence movements, which have largely sought to realise their 
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self-government ambitions within the context of European integration. 
Indeed, they have – at least until now – been amongst the most 
committed supporters of the project of pooled and shared sovereignty 
that EU integration has represented. It is ironic that those speaking on 
behalf of the EU have been among the staunchest defenders of a vision 
of national sovereignty that many thought belonged to a bygone era 
largely as a result of EU integration. This disconnect between the EU’s 
institutions and its most European-minded citizens risks undermining the 
legitimacy of the project of European integration itself.
References
Cameron, D., PM, (2014), “The importance of Scotland to the UK”. 
Speech delivered at Lee Valley Velo Park, 7 February. Available at: https://
www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-importance-of-scotland-to-the-
uk-david-camerons-speech
Curtice, J. and R. Ormston, (2013), Attitudes towards Scotland’s 
Constitutional Future. Available at: http://www.scotcen.org.uk/
media/176147/2012-scotlands-constitutional-future.pdf
Johns, R., Mitchell, J. and Carman, C. (2013), “Constitution 
or competence? The SNP’s re-election in 2011”, Political Studies, 
61(S1),158–78.
Keating, M. and N. McEwen, 2015, ‘the Scottish independence debate’, 
in Keating, M (ed.), Debating Scotland:  Issues of Independence and 
Union in the 2014 Referendum, Oxford University Press. 
Scottish Social Attitudes, (2017). From Indyref1 to Indyref2? The State 
of Nationalism in Scotland. Available at: http://www.ssa.natcen.ac.uk/
media/38910/ssa16-2fr8m-1ndyref-2-1ndyr8f-tw0-two.pdf
Sturgeon, N., (2013), Independence – a Renewed Partnership of the 
Isles. Speech delivered at the University of Edinburgh, 6 June. Available 
at: https://soundcloud.com/scotgov/dfm-independence-a-renewed
2017
Bart Maddens
Full professor of Political Science, University of Leuven
SECESSIONIST STRATEGIES: THE CASE OF FLANDERS
55 
F landers is often cited as one of the European regions which is closest to secession, together with Catalonia and Scotland. It is particularly the spectacular success of the separatist Nieuw-
Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA) which has fueled speculation about an 
imminent break-up of Belgium. In this paper, I will first of all assess 
how strong separatism really is in Flanders. Next, I will discuss both 
the discursive and the practical strategies the Flemish nationalists have 
developed against Belgium, with a special focus on the role of the EU 
in these strategies. Finally I will briefly deal with the current political 
situation and its possible implications. 
The Flemish paradox
If we look at the election results, the Flemish secessionist movement 
appears to be a growing and important political force in Belgium. 
As shown in Graph 1, the Flemish nationalist or autonomist parties 
increased their vote from 5.2% to 15% during the interbellum. After 
the Second World War there was a relapse due to the collaboration of 
a part of the Flemish movement with the German occupier. From the 
sixties onwards, the Flemish nationalist Volksunie party grew stronger 
and peaked in 1971 with 18.8% of the Flemish vote. During the nineties 
this centre party gradually waned due to internal ideological conflicts, 
and was replaced by the far-right and anti-immigrant Vlaams Blok, later 
renamed Vlaams Belang. This party peaked at 24% support in 2004.
The other Belgian parties refused to govern with this far-right party. This 
eventually caused the right-wing Flemish voters to turn to a new radical 
Flemish nationalist party, the N-VA, founded in 2001. This centre-right 
conservative party formed a cartel with the Christian democrats from 
2004 to 2008. After its breakthrough as a separate party in 2009, the 
N-VA grew spectacularly and became the dominant party in Flanders and 
Belgium, with 32.1% of the Flemish vote in 2014. Finally, the LDD was 
a libertarian party which split off from the liberal party in 2006 and also 
took a radical stance in favor of a confederal reform. It obtained 7.7% in 
2009 but faded away afterwards. 
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Graph 1 : Percentage of Flemish-nationalist or autonomist parties in Flemish 
region (national and non-concurrent regional elections 1919-2014)
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Together, these radical autonomist parties peaked at 43.7% of the 
Flemish vote in 2010. For the concurrent senate election, this percentage 
was even higher, namely 47.2%. In 2014, the total autonomist vote 
decreased somewhat as the N-VA improved its score mainly at the 
expense of Vlaams Belang, and the LDD almost disappeared. 
Nevertheless, in 2014 38.2% of Flemings voted for an overtly separatist 
party and Flemish secessionism was the largest political force in Belgium.
These election results stand in sharp contrast to survey data about the 
support for separatism in Flemish public opinion. According to election 
studies by ISPO, in 2014 only a marginal 6.4% of the Flemish favored 
outright separatism. This percentage increases somewhat in times of 
institutional crises, such as in 2007 and 2010, but is never higher than 
12%. A relative majority of about half of the Flemish is in favor of more 
competences for the regions, while rejecting separatism (Swyngedouw 
et al., 2015). 
Thus, separatist parties obtained 38.2% of the vote, while only 6.4% 
of the electorate is separatist. How can this paradox be explained? 
At first sight, a straightforward explanation is that voters vote for 
separatist parties for other reasons. This is obvious from the above 
cited ISPO election study. Only 11% of the N-VA voters in 2014 
mentioned the institutional issue as one of their motives for voting for 
the party. The main concerns of the N-VA voters were employment 
and labour (42.5%), healthcare (34.1%) and taxes and budget (30%). 
Similarly, only 7.9% of the Vlaams Belang voters were motivated by 
the institutional issue. Their reasons for a Vlaams Belang vote were 
mainly the issues of justice and criminality (54.5%) and migration and 
integration (49.5%).
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At the same time, these findings do not really solve the problem of the 
Flemish paradox, but merely restate it. Why would a non-separatist voter 
choose a separatist party because he or she wants lower taxes when 
there is another non-separatist party, more specifically the liberal party, 
which offers the same? If you feel very strongly about Belgian unity N-VA 
would not be a logical choice, to put it mildly. How come the threshold 
to vote for a separatist party has become so low, even for voters who, 
when asked, do not favor secession? It can be hypothesised that this is 
the result of the strategy of Flemish separatists over the last decades, to 
which I will now turn. 
“Belgium does not work” 
Flemish nationalists have always known that overt separatism is not 
so popular in Flanders. It is only the far-right Vlaams Belang which has 
defended an independent Flanders as a short-term goal, but the party 
has always put more emphasis on its anti-immigrant stance. The other 
Flemish nationalist parties have fostered a certain ambiguity about 
independence. The Volksunie was initially in favor of federalism (at 
a time when this was still a radical proposition), but shifted towards 
a more sovereigntist stance from the eighties onwards. The N-VA 
envisages a Flemish republic in the long run, but now focuses on 
confederalism as an intermediate step. 
During the last decades, Flemish nationalists have put less emphasis on 
maintaining and cultivating Flemish culture and the Dutch language. 
The linguistic issue is still important in Flemish nationalist discourse, 
more specifically the language legislation in Brussels and its periphery. 
But the main focus is now on economic issues. A hallmark of this new 
approach was the 2005 “Warande Manifest”, published by a Flemish 
think tank and endorsed by a number of prominent Flemish businessmen 
(Denkgroep ‘In de Warande’, 2005). 
This manifesto was the main source of inspiration for the discourse 
which the N-VA developed after its cartel with the Christian democrats 
collapsed in 2008. It is no coincidence that the first breakthrough for the 
party, at the regional election of 2009, coincided with the financial crisis 
and concomitant economic recession. The key message of the N-VA was 
that the Belgian state was unable to implement an efficient economic 
policy in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. “Belgium does not work” 
was one of its slogans. 
This is so, according to the party, because Belgium consists of two 
different democracies. Due to the split of the national parties across 
linguistic lines (at the end of the sixties and during the seventies), the 
Belgian political system consists of two largely separate party systems. 
Election results differ considerably between the regions. While the 
centre of gravity of the Francophone party system is left of centre, the 
Flemish voters predominantly choose parties on the right or centre-right 
of the political spectrum. Also, this divergence between election results 
has grown over the last decade. As a result, it has become impossible 
– according to the N-VA – to form a federal government that can 
implement a coherent policy, attuned to both the leftist preferences in 
the south and the rightist preferences in the north. 
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Another explanation for the inefficiency of Belgium, the N-VA argues, 
is that the institutional structure has become extremely complex as a 
result of the previous reforms of the state. Competences have been 
devolved in a piecemeal way, as a result of which it is not always 
clear who is responsible for what. The proliferation of competences 
at different levels has made it increasingly difficult to coordinate 
policy measures. The N-VA adds that this complexity has also created 
superfluous bureaucracies, particularly at the federal level. Because the 
competences were never entirely devolved, the federal administration 
was not substantially reduced. According to the party, this is one of the 
reasons why taxes are relatively high in Belgium and the citizens do not 
get enough “value for their money”. It is remarkable, by the way, that 
this discourse to a certain extent runs parallel to the arguments of the 
proponents of a strong Belgium. But while the latter draw the conclusion 
that a number of competences should be refederalised and that a 
hierarchy of norms should be established, the Flemish nationalists want 
to simplify the institutions by abolishing the federal level of government. 
Another central issue in the N-VA’s economic discourse concerns the 
transfers from the Flemish to the Walloon and Brussels region. A recent 
scientific study estimates these transfers to be about €7 billion per 
year (Decoster and Sas, 2017). The N-VA wants to maintain a certain 
solidarity, but argues that this should be limited in time in order to 
function as an incentive for Brussels and Wallonia to perform better. 
The present unlimited and automatic transfer, on the other hand, is 
considered to be “drug” to which the Walloon economy has become 
“addicted”. 
The results of the 2009 and following elections have shown that this 
rhetorical strategy was effective. While the economic problems were the 
main concern of the voters, the N-VA has managed to convince them 
that these could only be dealt with effectively by giving more autonomy 
to the regions. 
The EU in secessionist discourse
Initially, the N-VA was an outspoken pro-European party. The European 
flag was prominent at party rallies and victory celebrations. This was 
also in line with the stance of its predecessor, the Volksunie, which was 
in favor of a “Europe of the regions”. The Volksunie was cofounder of 
the European Free Alliance, which brought together regionalist parties 
at the EU level. The N-VA abandoned this idealistic approach, but used 
the existence of an ever stronger EU as an argument against Belgium. As 
competences have been massively devolved to both a higher and a lower 
level, Belgium itself has become a superfluous layer of government, it 
was argued. 
The party has also instrumentalised the “Size of Nations” approach 
proposed by the economists Alesina and Spolaore (2003). Thanks 
to the common market in the EU there need not be a trade-off 
between economies of scale and bringing policy in line with small-
scale preferences. The economies of scale are realised at a European 
supranational level, which facilitates the breaking up of states into 
smaller segments without economic drawbacks. In June 2005, Enrico 
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Spolaore was keynote speaker at an N-VA congress on “Flanders, state 
in Europe” (Tegenbos, 2005). 
Since its initial breakthrough in 2009, the N-VA has gradually shifted 
from a pro-European to a “Eurorealistic” stance. This development is 
analysed in detail by Brack et al. (2017). These authors show that the 
N-VA has become less enthusiastic about further European integration. 
The party now argues that the EU should focus on its core business of 
economic cooperation and explicitly rejects a federal Europe. It also plays 
with the idea of returning competences to the national level. The EU 
should remain a confederal entity – as Belgium should be in the future. 
This shift towards “Eurorealism” was also reflected in the choice of the 
party to join the parliamentary group of the European Conservatives and 
Reformists (ECR) in the European Parliament after the 2014 European 
election, even though the party remains a member of the European Free 
Alliance. 
Brack et al. (2017) also show that the party has remained ambiguous 
with regard to the EU and has not entirely embraced this “Eurorealist” 
stance. The discourse of the party spokesmen regarding the EU is 
generally more critical than the official party manifesto. The party 
appears to sense an electoral opportunity in overtly adopting 
Eurosceptical discourse, but is at the same time inhibited from fully 
grasping this opportunity. According to the authors, this can to a 
certain extent be explained by a change of generations in the party: 
the older politicians are still attached to the European ideals of the 
former Volksunie, while the younger ones are more Eurosceptical. But 
the reservations about full-fledged Euroscepticism might also be due 
to the fact that just a few years ago a stronger EU was a key argument 
against Belgium. In addition, the participation of the N-VA in the Belgian 
government, which has traditionally been strongly pro-European, may 
also put a brake on the Eurosceptic tendencies in the party. 
The pile village strategy
When Jan Jambon, the present federal minister of the interior, entered 
politics in the spring of 2007 his party formed a cartel with the Christian 
democrats. This cartel aimed at a new reform of the state, devolving 
new competences to the regions and communities particularly regarding 
taxes, healthcare and labor policy. Up to that time, Jan Jambon had been 
a leading member of the radical Flemish movement. At the beginning 
of the nineties, he had even pushed this movement towards an outright 
separatist stance. When asked about his remarkable metamorphosis 
from a radical separatist to a moderate realpolitiker in the CD&V/N-VA 
cartel, he compared the Belgian state to a pile village. If you take away 
one pile, he said, you will not notice the difference. If you take away 
a few other piles, the village will probably remain standing. But if you 
continue doing so, eventually the village will collapse. He added that he 
felt they were now close to that aim (Winckelmans, 2007). 
In this way, Jambon deftly described the strategy the Flemish nationalists 
have followed since the seventies. During the past half century, at each 
of the six consecutive reforms of the state (in 1970, 1980, 1988, 1992, 
2001 and 2011) new competences were devolved from the centre to the 
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regions and the communities. In 1988, 1992 and 2001 this was done 
with the support of Flemish nationalist votes. In themselves, a lot of 
these transfers were insignificant and partial. But, according to a reverse 
neo-functionalist logic, these seemingly insignificant reforms always 
sowed the seeds for new reforms and further transfers of powers. In this 
way, the Flemish nationalists have managed to hollow out the Belgian 
state in an incremental way. 
As a result, the central state has lost crucial competences needed for 
nation building and identity politics. For instance, the competences 
regarding culture and media were devolved towards the communities in 
1970, and competences regarding education were transferred in 1988. 
The recent Dutch government agreement envisages the obligation for 
schools to teach the national anthem as a means to strengthen a sense 
of national identity. The Belgian government, in contrast, could not 
take such a measure if it wanted to. The communities have exclusive 
competence in the field of education. If the Flemish government 
took take a similar measure, it would probably oblige the schools to 
teach “De Vlaamse Leeuw”, i.e. the Flemish anthem. During the past 
decades, the regions, and particularly Flanders, have made used of their 
competences to create or strengthen a sense of regional identity and to 
obtain legitimacy as separate political entities.
It could be argued that this strategy of hollowing out the state has led 
to a gradual erosion of Belgian patriotism – to a certain indifference 
towards Belgium as a nation. Put differently, Belgian nationalism has 
been reduced to its most banal level. The Belgian nationality is still 
accepted as a fact of everyday reality. The Flemish still view themselves 
as Belgians, and will describe themselves as “Belgians” abroad. But they 
are not particularly proud of their nationality. It could be hypothesised 
that there is a growing indifference towards the idea of “Belgium”. 
This might explain why the threshold for voting for a separatist party 
is so low, even among voters who oppose separatism, when asked in a 
survey. 
The “Scottish” strategy
After the 2014 elections, it was in theory possible to form a government 
without the N-VA at both the regional and the federal levels. As the 
N-VA did not have any political leverage to impose a new reform of the 
state, it had to abandon all institutional claims during the government 
formation negotiations. The party had to agree to a government 
standstill of five years in return for taking part in a federal centre-right 
government. This government has a broad majority in Flanders, but 
no majority in Wallonia. The only Francophone party in the coalition 
represents just 25.5% of the electorate in the Walloon region. 
In this way, the predominantly left-wing Wallonia is governed by a 
“Flemish” right-wing majority. The N-VA hopes that the left-wing 
majority in Wallonia will become so fed up with being ruled by a right-
wing Flemish majority that it will eventually demand a confederal 
reform of the state (De Wever, 2017). Still, such a scenario is unlikely in 
the short run. It would take a spectacular U-turn by the Francophone 
socialists to accept the confederal model of the N-VA and the splitting-
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up of social security. Arguably, the Francophone socialists will try to avoid 
what they consider a trap set by the Flemish nationalists. Nevertheless, 
such a development cannot be ruled out in the long run. In the same 
way as the Thatcher governments radicalised the left-wing Scottish 
voters and fuelled the drive for Scottish independence, a continuous 
dominance of right-wing Flemish parties at the federal level may sharpen 
the Walloon appetite for more autonomy. 
It also remains to be seen how the N-VA will evolve. It is highly 
unusual for a regionalist anti-system party to participate in a national 
government. It is even more unusual for such a party to obtain the 
ministerial portfolios that are most associated with the central state 
(treasury, defence, interior affairs). This might draw the N-VA into the 
political system and gradually transform it into a centre-right mainstream 
party with, at most, moderate institutional demands.
Concluding remark: Does the N-VA make Belgium 
work? 
It can be argued that during the past decades Flemish-nationalists have 
succeeded in gradually delegitimising the Belgian state. While this has 
not involved increasing the number of separatists in Flanders, it may 
have lowered the threshold for voting for an anti-Belgian party. The 
N-VA has managed to convince voters that it can meet its concerns and 
provide an exit from the economic crisis by giving more autonomy to 
Flanders. As a result of this strategy, the N-VA has become the largest 
party in Flanders and Belgium. However, in order to take part in the 
current federal government it had to agree to an institutional standstill 
of five years. 
As a governing party, the N-VA is obliged to abandon its former slogan 
that “Belgium does not work”. The party now alleges that the centre-
right coalition is waging an efficient economic policy and is carrying 
through reforms that were never possible under the previous centrist 
governments. The obvious implication is that, apparently, Belgium 
does work. There is thus a tension between the defence of the current 
economic policy on the hand and the former institutional rhetoric on the 
other. For that reason, the N-VA has recently announced that it will not 
emphasise this institutional issue during the 2019 election. Instead, it will 
focus its campaign on the issues of security, identity and the economy. 
In this way, the party appears to pave the way for a continuation of the 
present government and the concomitant institutional standstill. 
As the Flemish nationalists had to keep silent about the Flemish-
Walloon conflict in order not to destabilise the government, the 
institutional issue dropped considerably on the public agenda. Since 
2014, the federal state is now perceived to function quite normally, 
at least in Flanders. There are some indications that this has led to a 
relegitimisation of Belgium. The trust in the Belgian government and 
the Belgian institutions appears to have increased (Dujardin, 2017). 
This development may be strengthened if the N-VA would agree to a 
new institutional standstill after the 2019 elections. But it is far from 
certain that this will be accepted by the Flemish-nationalist rank and 
file of the party. 
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THE TWO QUEBEC INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUMS: 
POLITICAL STRATEGIES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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Q uebec is exceptional among all  cases of nationalist movements in liberal democracies, as governments formed by the secessionist Parti Québécois (PQ) have organised two 
independence referendums (see Table 1). Thus, the Quebec case offers 
particularly fertile ground for examining how a secessionist party 
seeks to convince a majority of voters to support independence in a 
referendum campaign while a host of other actors (within the province, 
across the country, and around the world) make a case against secession. 
The unique Quebec experience with two independence referendums 
reveals something important: each of the referendums had its own 
political dynamic, featuring its own set of secessionist strategies and 
counter-strategies as well as specific international contexts. Indeed, the 
political dynamics of the referendums of 1980 and 1995 were shaped by 
the preceding 15–20 year period. These “slices of history” informed how 
secessionist actors sought to prevail in each of the referendums.
The 1980 referendum: Emancipation and social 
democracy
The 1980 Quebec referendum came on the heels of a process of 
modernisation in the province known as the Quiet Revolution. 
Engineered by Quebec governments beginning in the 1960s, the Quiet 
Revolution featured, among other things, measures to improve the 
socioeconomic status of Francophones, rendered difficult by decades of 
mostly conservative politics and strong Church influence, and legislation 
to promote French language and culture at a time when English was 
the dominant language at the highest echelons of the province’s 
economy (McRoberts, 1993). The (Liberal) Quebec governments of the 
Quiet Revolution also argued that they shouldered the special burden 
of looking after the only mainly French-speaking society in North 
America and that, as a result, Quebec should enjoy extensive autonomy 
within the Canadian federation and be recognised as different within 
its constitutional framework. The PQ, formed in 1968, went a step 
further and argued that the full emancipation of Francophones required 
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Quebec to be a sovereign state. Its majority government in 1976 gave 
the secessionist party the opportunity to organise a referendum on 
independence.
The PQ deployed two main arguments during the 1980 referendum 
campaign, both very broad in nature and anchored into the developing 
Québécois nationalism that was pushing aside notions of French-
Canadian solidarity (Balthazar, 2013).
The first argument was that a sovereign Quebec could fully emancipate 
Francophones. For the PQ, independence was a project for the province’s 
Francophone majority, as it was argued that an independent state could 
best protect and promote its socioeconomic, cultural, and linguistic 
interests. At that time, there was virtually no effort made to convince 
Anglophones and new immigrants, who were overwhelmingly in favour 
of Quebec remaining part of Canada, to support independence. Not 
only did the PQ judge that there was basically no chance to change the 
views of even a handful of members of these communities, but running 
a campaign centred on the notion of giving Francophone Quebeckers 
“a country” was not widely viewed as a problematic idea. Hence, the 
cultural content of the campaign was very substantial. French, in all its 
dimensions, was central to the argument for independence, and singers, 
artists and poets were at the forefront of the “Yes” campaign.  
The second broad argument made by the PQ was that independence could 
be used to create a fairer, more egalitarian society where the state would 
be used extensively to bridge the gap between rich and poor. The PQ was 
created as a social democratic party and, during its government years 
preceding the referendum (1976–1980), implemented many progressive 
measures, particularly in the labour market. Trade unions were close to the 
PQ and supportive of independence, which they saw as a way to improve 
the socioeconomic status of Francophones and to create a more labour-
friendly environment. The PQ argued that Quebec independence would 
be used to create a different type of society, one inspired by the social 
democracies of Scandinavia (Béland and Lecours, 2008). 
The PQ recognised the radical nature of its project, and sought to reassure 
Quebeckers that they would have a chance to confirm their decision to 
become independent at a later stage. Indeed, the party adopted a so-called 
gradualist approach (l’étapisme) whereby it first sought Quebeckers’ 
support to discuss a “sovereignty-association” arrangement with Canada 
and would subsequently organise another referendum to ratify whatever 
“association” had been negotiated. The PQ opted to use the concept of 
“sovereignty” (rather than independence, which arguably sounded more 
like a rupture), and to couple it with the notion of a (primarily economic) 
association with Canada. These elements (l’étapisme, sovereignty-
association) made for a “softer” question.1   
To counter these arguments, the federal government used a two-
pronged strategy. First, then Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau articulated 
a strong defence of Canada, emphasising that the country belonged 
to Quebeckers as much as it did to other Canadians. For many 
Quebeckers, especially older ones whose formative years pre-dated 
the Quiet Revolution and strongly identified as “French-Canadians”, 
this was a powerful argument. Second, the federal government 
1. The question was: “The 
Government of Quebec has made 
public its proposal to negotiate a 
new agreement with the rest of 
Canada, based on the equality 
of nations; this agreement would 
enable Quebec to acquire the exclu-
sive power to make its laws, levy its 
taxes and establish relations abroad 
– in other words, sovereignty – and 
at the same time to maintain with 
Canada an economic association 
including a common currency; any 
change in political status resulting 
from these negotiations will only 
be implemented with popular 
approval through another referen-
dum; on these terms, do you give 
the Government of Quebec the 
mandate to negotiate the proposed 
agreement between Quebec and 
Canada?”
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predicted that independence would come with dire economic and 
financial consequences, and that Quebec would be a small, isolated, 
and poor sovereign state. The international context of the time gave 
these economic arguments some credibility. Indeed, at a time where 
economies were still (state) national, Quebec’s trading was very much 
oriented towards the rest of Canada.  
In the international politics of Quebec independence, there are two 
significant actors: France, historically and culturally the most meaningful 
external state for the province, and the superpower neighbour, the 
United States. In the 1960s, France expressed support for Quebec 
independence, as demonstrated by General de Gaulle’s “Vive le Québec 
libre!” pronouncement on the balcony of Montreal’s city hall in 1967. 
Although such enthusiasm had tempered under Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, 
there remained enough sympathy for the PQ’s project in the French 
government to have France develop a specific formula to designate 
the country’s position towards secessionist politics in Quebec: non-
ingérence, non-indifférence (non-meddling, non-indifference) (Bastien, 
1999). This stood in sharp contrast to the United States, which took an 
unambiguous position in favour of a united Canada. In fact, the idea 
of independence was really badly received in the United States where 
the socio-democratic ideology of the secessionist movement led some 
to suggest independence would transform the province into a “Cuba 
North,” an unwelcome proposition in a United States still in the middle 
of the Cold War. Moreover, despite PQ premier René Lévesque’s attempt 
to compare its project to the American War of Independence when 
speaking to an American audience, secessionist politics brought up 
references to the Civil War instead.  Although the impact of international 
factors on the 1980 referendum is impossible to assess with any 
precision, it was most likely marginal. Not only did the French and 
American positions conform to the expectations of the actors involved in 
the referendum but, as the gradualist approach of the PQ meant that the 
first vote did not immediately entail a declaration of independence, there 
was no urgent need to actively seek support for recognition.   
The 1995 referendum: A backlash against failed 
constitutional negotiations
The second referendum on Quebec independence was the product 
of a very different political dynamic to the first. By the mid-1990s, 
Francophone Quebeckers by and large no longer felt like they required 
“emancipation” or “liberation”. Language legislation had helped to 
both strengthen the position of French and further the socioeconomic 
status of Francophones. Although the PQ still presented itself as social 
democratic, the party appeared much more business-friendly than 
before. The nature of nationalist mobilisation in Quebec had changed 
but arguably reached new heights in the early 1990s when constitutional 
negotiations aiming at meeting the demands of Quebec governments 
(after a new constitution act was adopted in 1982 without its consent) 
ultimately failed (Laforest, 1995).
These failed negotiations constituted the essence of the argument of the 
“yes” camp in 1995. Independence was best, according to “yes” side 
leaders, because Quebec’s minimal conditions for a constitutional accord 
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(including, most importantly, recognition of its distinctiveness) had been too 
much for the rest of Canada to accept. These leaders deployed a narrative 
of exhaustion, similar to that of present-day Catalonia (Basta, forthcoming), 
which stated that Quebec governments had tried everything to make 
it work within Canada but to no avail, and that in these circumstances 
independence was the only option. The constitutional odyssey of the 1980s 
and early 1990s was presented as a rejection of Quebec by Canada. Its 
main actors were vilified and/or presented as traitors (for example, then 
Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, himself a Quebecker). The leaders of the 
“yes” side remained vague about what independence would mean, only 
arguing that with a “yes” anything would be possible. 
Like in 1980, the “yes” side spoke of sovereignty rather than 
independence, and stated there would be an offer of economic and 
political partnership (never specifically defined) made to Canada once 
Quebeckers had voted for secession. By the early 1990s, there was also 
a secessionist party operating at the federal level (the Bloc Québécois, 
BQ), and a small nationalist party in the Quebec party system (Action 
démocratique du Québec, ADQ) that chose to support independence. 
The PQ referenced this multi-party support in the question, which was, 
just like in 1980, of the “soft” variety.2
For its part, the federal government seemed content to keep a low profile 
for the longest time, believing that a “yes” vote was impossible. There 
was virtually no appeal to the Canadian identity of Quebeckers, something 
which prominent federalists in the province later said had been a major 
mistake (Hébert and Lapierre, 2014). Arguments about the economic 
and financial risks of secession were less effective than they had been in 
1980. The free-trade agreement with the United States, of which the PQ 
had been supportive in part for strategic reasons, had made the Quebec 
economy less dependent on the rest of Canada (Martin, 1995). When the 
“yes” side picked up steam late in the campaign (after charismatic BQ 
leader Lucien Bouchard was given a bigger role in the campaign – evidence 
of the importance of agency in these events), the federal government 
responded with last minute promises that were met with derision. The 
“no” camp barely hung on, winning 50.6% of the vote.
The position of international actors seemed to have had little effect 
on the campaign, although the new international context might 
have helped the “yes” side. Unsurprisingly, the United States took a 
position against Quebec independence. However, in the post-Cold 
War era, characterised by the liberalisation of trade, there was no 
reference to “Cuba North” coming from the American government, 
and independence did not seem to imply isolation and poverty. The 
French government stuck to its non-meddling, non-indifference formula, 
stating that it would accompany Quebec on whichever path it chose. 
This seemed to be neutral enough for the Canadian government, but 
“yes” side leaders took it to mean that France would recognise Quebec 
as an independent state following a declaration of independence. In 
fact, then PQ premier Jacques Parizeau was extremely active in seeking 
support for a unilateral declaration of independence that would follow 
a “yes” win (an exercise dubbed “le grand jeu”). After his visit to Paris 
in January 1995, Parizeau was convinced that France would immediately 
recognise Quebec after the PQ government proclaimed its independence 
following a “yes” win; that other French-speaking countries would then 
2. The question was: “Do you agree 
that Quebec should become sove-
reign after having made a formal 
offer to Canada for a new economic 
and political partnership within the 
scope of the bill respecting the futu-
re of Quebec and of the agreement 
signed on June 12, 1995?”
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do the same; and that the United States, faced with what the premier 
foresaw at that point as being a fait accompli and not wanting to be 
too far behind France in recognising a new country in North America, 
would follow suit (Ici Radio-Canada, no date). This being said, there was 
no sense during the campaign that the prospects of recognition were 
affecting Quebeckers’ choice, most supporters of independence taking it 
for granted that it would materialise after a referendum win.
Conclusion
The story of the Quebec referendums shows that secessionist and counter-
secessionist strategies are contextual: they are inseparable from the 
political dynamics of the previous decade or so. Still, there is some agency 
involved in these strategies, and the Quebec case may present some 
lessons for both secessionists and their political adversaries elsewhere. 
For secessionists, the greater support for independence in the second 
Quebec referendum suggests that focusing the argument on the state’s 
refusal to acknowledge, symbolically and institutionally, the existence of 
an internal nation maybe a more fruitful strategy (certainly one around 
which more people can rally) than attaching to independence some grand 
social project (with which many can find various faults). For counter-
secessionists, the Quebec referendums recall the importance of actively 
speaking to the merits of the country and the history of the internal nation 
within it as a way to counter the narratives of rejection, dysfunction, and 
exhaustion mobilised by supporters of independence.
The Quebec experience does not contain real insight on gaining 
international recognition for independence against the wishes of the 
state since both of the referendums failed to produce a majority for 
the “yes” side. The PQ always felt it had a secret weapon because of 
Quebec’s so-called privileged relationship with France, but the exact 
response of the French government following a “yes” win remains 
unknown. In all likelihood, international recognition of Quebec 
independence would have greatly hinged on the reaction of the federal 
government. Although the federal government campaigned against 
independence in both referendums, thereby informally accepting its 
legitimacy, a short “yes” vote would have posed quite the dilemma.
A third referendum on independence is extremely unlikely in the short 
to medium term as support for secession is at its lowest point in 
decades. Indeed, contrary to the expectations long held by secessionists, 
young Quebeckers (18–34 years old) cannot be counted on to support 
independence today, and even within the generation that carried the 
project beginning in the 1970s support for secession is below 40% 
(see Table 2). Moreover, both the domestic and international contexts 
are presently less conducive to Quebec independence than they were 
in 1995. Domestically, the enactment of the so-called clarity legislation 
in 1999 (following a reference of the Supreme Court of Canada on 
secession) gives the federal government oversight on the referendum 
question and the majority required for a “yes” win (although this is 
challenged by Quebec). Internationally, French governments have been 
less supportive of Quebec self-determination in recent years, while the 
increased complexity of issues such as border control means the United 
States government might be even more pro-Canadian unity than before.  
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Table 1. Results of the Quebec independence referendums
1980 Referendum 1995 Referendum
Yes 40.44% 49.42%
No 59.56% 40.58%
Turnout 85.61% 93.52%
Source: CROP 2015
Table 2. Contemporary support for Quebec independence
Answer to the question: “If today there was a referendum on the following question: 
‘Do you want Quebec to be an independent country?’ would you vote yes or no?”
Age Maternal Tongue
Total 18-34 35-44 55+ French Other
Yes 36% 30% 38% 39% 43% 12%
No 64% 70% 62% 61% 57% 88%
Source: CROP 2015
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Introduction
Greenland and the Faroes are autonomous jurisdictions within the 
Danish Realm, having undertaken a continuous process of extended 
self-determination in the post-WWII era. In both jurisdictions there are 
strong movements of secession and counter-secession, whose respective 
strengths are largely achieved through external relations. 
This paper will first provide an introduction to the historical background 
and the formal relationship between the two jurisdictions and their 
metropolitan state. We will then extend the two cases with a description 
of how increased internal autonomy has evolved in a dynamic interaction 
with changes in international affairs. Whether the two jurisdictions may 
move towards full secession or new forms of unity is difficult to predict, 
but external relations keep on pushing at the formal structures and limits 
of the realm, which we will briefly reflect upon in the final section. 
The Danish Realm
The Faroe Islands, Iceland and Greenland were originally Norwegian 
protectorates. They became parts of the Danish-Norwegian Kingdom from 
1380 and Danish absolutism since 1661. After the Napoleonic War Norway 
was ceded to Sweden, while the three West Nordic countries remained 
Danish. They constitute a relatively strong region of culture as they also 
share the adoption of Christianity around the year 1000, the Reformation 
in the 16th century and many decades of a common Trade Monopoly. 
Iceland became a sovereign state in 1918 and a republic in 1944, while the 
Faroes and Greenland have taken a quite different route of autonomy.
While the Faroes were an integrated part of Danish absolutism, Greenland 
became a colony after 1721. The Faroes were therefore integrated into the 
particular Nordic county (amt) system that developed under absolutism, 
and became their own county in 1816. In 1852 the county became its 
own electorate, following the Danish track towards democracy. In 1948 
the Faroe Islands received their home rule system, which is still in force but 
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with pragmatic changes in its principle and practice. In 1992, for instance, 
the Faroes gained full sovereignty over their own subsoil, and a declaration 
from 2005 describes the principles of how the Faroes are included in the 
foreign and security affairs of the Danish Realm.
Following the path of post-war decolonisation, Greenland received amt 
status (county status) in 1953 and its home rule system in 1979. In 2009 
home rule law was replaced by a new Self-Government Act, which 
can be seen as a system between home rule and full independence. 
The Self-Government Act for the first time defines the Greenlandic 
people as a separate people according to international law. The act also 
defines Greenlandic rights to its own subsoil, principles for Greenlandic 
involvement in international affairs, and even some principles which will 
be constitutive if Greenland wants full independence.
The two autonomous systems provide Greenland and the Faroes with 
a high degree of “internal self-determination” (Seymour, 2011). This 
means that the two countries can make their own laws in areas that 
have been taken over from the state: they can levy taxes and are 
independent custom areas. In practice both countries today have taken 
over most areas which may be termed “internal”. Vital policy areas of 
the state such as currency, foreign policy, high courts and defence are 
solely under Danish jurisdiction. 
Secessionism in the Faroe Islands
The establishment of its own amt institution in 1816, the permanent 
position of an Amtmand (county governor) and the establishment of 
a county council, the Løgting, in 1852 are important steps towards 
Faroese modernisation. Around the same time a cultural movement 
centred on the situation of the Faroese language began to grow among 
young Faroese students in Copenhagen. While the official language 
in the Faroes was Danish, the old Faroese language had survived in 
oral tradition. There was no written language, but the priest V. U. 
Hammershaimb (1819–1909) made a specific Faroese grammar in 1846, 
which still is the foundation of modern Faroese. The cultural movement 
arose among youngsters from the Faroese elite living in Copenhagen, 
which turned into a powerful national movement within the Faroes in 
the late 1880s. A national association (Føringafelag) was established in 
1889 with the mission of getting the Faroese language back to its glory 
and can be seen as successful, since Faroese was officially accepted for 
use in churches and schools in the late 1930s and is today the official 
language, while Danish is thoroughly taught. Part of the story is also 
that the Faroe Islands during the latter part of 19th century transformed 
from a peasant community to a fishing community based on classical 
liberalism. 
After the turn of the 20th century the Føringafelag was settled, and 
a party system started in 1906 with MPs starting the Unionist Party 
(Sambandsflokkurin) and the Home Rule Party (Sjálvstýrisflokkurin). 
In 1925 a Social Democratic Party (Javnaðarflokkurin) was established 
and in 1935 a corporate friendly conservative party was founded 
(Vinnuflokkurin, later Fólkaflokkurin [the People’s Party]). While the 
first two parties were divided along the unionism-secessionism line, the 
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two latter parties made the socioeconomic division visible in Faroese 
politics. The Social Democrats are unionists, while the People’s Party is 
secessionist.
While Denmark in 1940 was occupied by German troops, English 
troops soon after arrived in the Faroes, making the two countries totally 
separate for years. The British accepted for the Løgting to receive some 
legislative power, the Faroese language was recognised for use in judicial 
affairs and even Faroese money was printed. The British also recognised 
the Faroese flag, which was a necessity for identifying Faroese ships 
transporting fish to the British mainland.
After the war it was clear that a return to the old county system was not 
an option, but no agreement was on the table. A chaotic negotiating 
process in the Løgting, and between the Løgting and the Danish 
government arose. Finally the Danish government enforced two options 
to be decided upon in a referendum. The first option only gave the 
Faroese parliament the power to make “administrative regulations of 
legislative character” regarding specific Faroese matters; a Danish state 
representative should lead the Faroese government. The other alternative 
was full separation (Sølvará, 2016: 65ff.).
Only a few in the political elite actually believed that a vote for full 
separation was possible. But the home rule and independence groups 
had already grown stronger before the war, and during the war years 
a great deal changed around self-reliance. First, the Løgting received 
legislative power after the British occupation. Next, the war was the 
second in a few decades in which Denmark was not able to defend the 
interests of the kingdom in the north Atlantic. Third, from an economic 
point of view the war years had been beneficial. Fourth, during the 
census campaign a group of secessionist intellectuals, mainly outside 
the party system, produced informative material and wandered around 
the islands claiming full sovereignty. The surprising result for the political 
elite was that the referendum resulted in a small majority for full 
independence (50.7% against 49.3%). 
The first reaction from Denmark was that the result should be 
respected, but then the result was questioned by unionists and the 
Danish government as well. It was claimed that the referendum was 
consultative only, and that the 4.1% of invalid votes should be taken 
into consideration. After a majority of the Løgting had actually passed 
a declaration of Faroese sovereignty, the legality of the Løgting doing so 
was questioned, followed by the King’s dissolution of the Løgting. A new 
election was called for with a more unionist-friendly assembly, resulting 
in the establishing of the Home Rule system in 1948. Disappointed 
secessionists founded the Republican Party (Tjóðveldisflokkurin), which 
has since then been the focal point for the most convinced secessionists.
The Home Rule Act divides the future relations between the Faroes 
and Denmark into two areas: special areas and common areas. Special 
areas are those matters the Faroese government can claim control over 
when it wants to do so. Common affairs can only be taken over after 
negotiations and subsequent approval by the Danish government. 
Outside the Home Rule Act are key areas like the court system, currency, 
defence and foreign affairs. These areas are considered to be matters of 
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the kingdom, and hence they may not be taken over. In general we can 
say that the home rule system opens up an independent internal system 
of government. When the Faroese parliament takes over an area, the 
area is subject to Faroese law and government. The first law the Faroese 
parliament passed was a Government Act, followed by the takeover 
of key political and economic areas (e.g., tax levying and the fisheries) 
(Hovgaard and Johansen, 1993: 65f.). 
After years of “home rule”-oriented governments, the first secessionist 
government was established in the years 1962–1966. This was a 
government between the People’s Party, the Republican Party and 
the Home Rule Party, but it actually never made any decisive step 
towards secessionism. The main reason for this was disagreement about 
financing transfers of power; probably also the fact that the Danish 
state made heavy investments in the Faroese welfare system. As a 
consequence of the Home Rule Act, the Faroese could themselves decide 
not to follow Denmark into the EC in 1973. Generally, the 1970s and 
1980s were years of progress in the economy and Faroese Home Rule 
took over substantial social welfare areas. 
A deep economic and social recession appeared around 1990 and the 
Danish government interfered in internal Faroese matters, which was 
one of the main reasons deep conflicts in the Faroese-Danish relationship 
appeared. Secessionism turned out to be the key political agenda in 
a second secession coalition government from 1998 to 2002. Three 
parties out of four on the secessionist side of the parliament – the 
Republicans, the People’s Party and the Home Rule Party – formed the 
coalition. Negotiations about sovereignty were taken up with the Danish 
government, and a referendum was put on the government agenda. The 
referendum was never completed for one main reason: the parties could 
not come to terms with the economic conditions posed by the Danish 
government during the transition phase. The Danish government offered 
a four-year block grant, while the Faroese delegation had hoped for a 
much longer period. The most radical action the second secessionist 
government managed was to decrease the yearly block grant from 
Denmark by one-third.
Today nearly all policy areas of the Home Rule Act have been taken over 
by the Faroese parliament. In the early 1990s the government even took 
over ownership of the subsoil, a policy area earlier expected to be non-
negotiable. Family and inheritance law will soon be taken over, which 
will be the last field of the larger areas mentioned in the Home Rule Act. 
Aquaculture and tourism have made the Faroese economy more 
diversified, but it is still largely tied up with the catching, production 
and sale of fish. While also hit by the 2007–2008 financial crises the 
economy has been extensively growing since around 2010 with per 
capita GDP levels expected to be as high as or higher than in Denmark. 
After being out in the political opposition most of the years since 2002, 
the Republicans managed to join a new government led by the Social 
Democrats and a recently established secessionist party, Framsókn 
(Liberals). Although the government has taken some steps to decrease 
dependence upon Danish transfers (which today only count for a few 
percentage points of GDP), and has declared a referendum on a Faroese 
constitution, it does not have secessionism as an objective.
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Secessionism in Greenland
In 1721, the Lutheran missionary Hans Egede arrived in Greenland to 
re-Christianise what he thought would be survivors from the Old Norse 
settlements. However, these settlements were no longer in existence. 
Egede then turned to Christianising the local population, the indigenous 
Inuit people. Greenland had since 1721 been considered a trading 
colony, where the Royal Greenlandic Trading Company (KGH) regulated 
all commerce to and from Greenland, a system which functioned until 
1950 (Ackrén, 2014). Even the country’s administration was in the 
hands of KGH until 1912. By the mid-1900s, the Royal Greenlandic 
Trading Company had also gained social and administrative functions in 
Greenland.
During the Second World War, Greenland was under US protection. In 
1953 Greenland became a county (amt) in the Danish Kingdom (Dahl, 
1986), which meant that the colonial era had come to an end, but a 
post-colonial period started as new investments and new developments 
were made by the Danish state. This led to some important changes 
in Greenlandic society. Heavy social and economic changes appeared 
during the 1950s and 1960s, while the living standards in Greenland 
were enhanced and new housing and infrastructure were built, and the 
health sector was improved as well.
There were some political movements back in the 1940s – a Nazi-group 
in Sisimiut, a communist party in Qullissat, and a Greenlandic Social 
Democratic Party existed in 1955. These parties were not long-lived. The 
first real political party, the Inuit Party, was formed in 1964 as a protest 
party against the Danish treatment of Greenlanders in Greenland. The 
movement started in Copenhagen amongst well-educated Greenlanders, 
who saw their country from abroad and opposed how the Danish 
administration was functioning in Greenland (Ackrén, 2015). The Inuit 
Party considered that Greenlanders should be seen as a separate people 
according to the principle of self-determination, since they had their 
own culture, language and traditions. Another aim was to liberalise the 
business industry. The party was, however, not very successful and a few 
years later it ceased to exist.
When Denmark became a member of the EC in 1973, Greenland was 
forced to join, since it did not have the same rights as the Faroe Islands. 
Greenland had its own referendum, in which the majority (about 70%) 
voted against membership (Gad, 2014). This triggered the debate about 
Home Rule, which was implemented in 1979. Thereafter Greenland 
had a new EC referendum, which resulted in withdrawal from the EC 
in 1985. Instead, Greenland became an OCT (Overseas Country and 
Territory) within the EC (Gad, 2014). Other issues triggering a “new 
political movement” in the early 1970s were Denmark giving licenses to 
international oil companies to explore Greenlandic waters and the fact 
that many European fishing vessels were entering Greenlandic waters.
Particularly, the left of centre party Siumut (Forward), established in 
1975–76, played a crucial role in mobilising against Danish rule. Siumut, 
with the centre-right Atassut (Solidarity), established in 1978, and the 
leftist Inuit Ataqatigiit (Inuit Community) established in 1976, all pressed 
for Home Rule negotiations. A home rule commission with Greenlandic 
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and Danish politicians was finally established, and the Home Rule Act 
was agreed upon and accepted in Greenland in a referendum in 1978. 
Faroese home rule was the key model.
From 2000 a new commission for self-government was established to 
evaluate the first 20 years of home rule. The political parties were also 
eager to develop the country in the direction of more autonomy. The 
commission realised that Greenland needed extended autonomy in 
various areas, and a new agreement with Denmark was entered into in 
November 2008. At the referendum a clear majority of the Greenlandic 
people voted in favour of the new Self-Government Act (75%). The Act 
was implemented on June 21st 2009 (Ackrén, 2015). In the preamble the 
Greenlandic people are defined as a people according to international 
law with the right to self-determination. This means that Greenland 
can secede from the Danish Realm in the future if the population has 
the will to do so. The preamble also states that equality and mutual 
respect should be held between Denmark and Greenland and that the 
agreement is between equal partners (Lov om Grønlands Selvstyre).
The largest change between the Home Rule Act of 1979 and the Self-
Government Act of 2009 relates to economics and natural resources. 
The block grant is now fixed at DKK 3.4 billion (about €442 million) 
according to 2009 prices. A yearly adjustment is made in relation 
to inflation. Natural resources are now in the hands of Greenland, 
and Greenland has also received a bit more room for manoeuvre in 
international relations.
Since the latest election (2014) five parties are represented in 
parliament, Siumut (social democrats), Inuit Ataqatigiit (Inuit community; 
left) and Partii Naleraq (Compass needle; left-conservatives) which 
constitute the coalition, while the other two parties; Demokraatit 
(Democrats; social liberals) and Atassut (Solidarity; right-conservatives) 
are in opposition. Siumut, Inuit Ataqatigiit, Demokraatit and Partii 
Naleraq all lean towards independence, while Atassut leans towards 
unionism with Denmark. The government is working to develop a 
Greenlandic constitution, while the political discussion is between those 
who opt for a kind of associate statehood with Denmark and those who 
favour complete independence.
Secessionism and its external dynamics
Although starting at different periods of time, secessionism in the 
Faroe Islands and Greenland is largely influenced by external relations. 
In both cases protests started in Denmark amongst native intellectuals 
influenced by international cultural and political movements, and 
in both cases WWII had a great influence. The developments in 
Iceland have always provided a “role-model”, especially for Faroese 
secessionists.
In the Greenlandic case the establishment of political parties came later, 
primarily as a result of the decolonisation process during the 1960s and 
1970s. On another note indigenous movements became a new political 
force in several parts of the world, which also may be seen as a result of 
Greenlandic political awakening. 
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Both regions have developed their home rule during times of self-
governance, and how far it is possible to actually stretch the home 
rule/self-government is an ever-present question. The pro-independence 
government in the Faroe Islands back in 1998 did for instance come up 
with a White Book and worked on a proposal for a constitution. Today 
both countries are at work on constitutions of their own, and a referendum 
on a Faroese constitution has been declared for 2018. A possible date for a 
Greenlandic referendum is still left unknown. The main difference between 
the island regions is that the Faroe Islands are more economically prepared 
for independence, but the political will is hesitant; on the other hand, in 
Greenland there is a clear political will, but the economy is not in order. 
In small island jurisdictions as Greenland and the Faroes, politics usually 
swing between secession and counter-secession movements, but 
processes of globalisation, including the intensified geopolitical and 
economic interests in Arctic development will keep pushing forward 
new limits and strategies for the two jurisdictions in international affairs 
and challenge their position within the Danish Realm (Eythórsson and 
Hovgaard 2013; Eythórsson and Hovgaard, forthcoming).
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WHO COUNTS? WHY DO GOVERNMENTS DENY 
SECESSION IN SOME CASES BUT NOT OTHERS?
79 
If there is one constant in history apart from the universality 
of death and taxes, it is the reluctance of states to part with territory
Michael Hechter (1992: 277).
T here is a received wisdom that states will always deny secessionist demands. Land is too valuable and/or too important to the national image. The very idea of the sovereign state is predicated 
on territorial control. Permitting one region to secede will only embolden 
others; therefore, the links in the chain must be defended. These are 
all commonly given explanations for why states will deny secessionists 
and fight them if they have to. There is no question that blood has been 
spilled over the issue, from the US Civil War to the conflict in Biafra 
to the fighting in Chechnya. It is estimated that half of the civil wars 
since 1945 have involved secessionism (Griffiths, 2015: 733), and one 
prominent scholar claims that secessionism is the chief source of violence 
in the world today (Walter, 2009: 3).
However, these explanations belie a much more nuanced set of dynamics 
where secession is concerned. In fact, states have permitted secessionists 
to vote on the issue in a number of cases (Scotland in 2014) and 
permitted the secession when the “Yes” vote prevailed (Montenegro in 
2006). The processes of decolonisation and dissolution transformed the 
international system and are two of the biggest reasons for the threefold 
increase in the number of states since 1945 (Griffiths, 2016: 2). But 
these events were merely secession by another name. Collectively, they 
illustrate that states and the international community are prepared – 
indeed motivated – to permit secession under certain circumstances. This 
essay will outline those circumstances by describing three interrelated 
factors: (1) The international recognition regime; (2) The calculus of state 
response; and (3) The resulting strategy of secession.
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The international recognition regime
Secession is “the creation of a new [internationally recognised] state 
upon existing territory previously forming part of, or being a colonial 
entity of, an existing sovereign state” (Radan, 2008: 18). There are 195 
states in the international system, depending on how you count, and 
any new state represents a subtraction in territory from at least one 
existing state. Yet there were 55 secessionist movements as of 2011 
(Griffiths, 2016: 52), and many more waiting in the wings. Figure 1 
illustrates the number of sovereign states and secessionist movements 
per year since 1900. The existing states act in many ways like a club; 
secessionist movements are all applicants to the club (Griffiths, 2017). 
What are the criteria for joining the club and how are the resulting 
pressures managed?
Figure 1: Sovereign states and secessionist movements, 1900–2011
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Secessionist Movements
All of this is managed in large part by the international recognition 
regime, a body of evolving norms, rules, and practices that determines 
which claimants can become independent states (Grant, 1999; Fabry, 
2010; Coggins, 2014). Although the act of recognition remains the 
prerogative of individual states, and strong states often do what they 
want, such acts are guided by the international recognition regime. 
At the heart of that regime is a basic tension between two prominent 
norms in international life. On one hand, there is the norm of territorial 
integrity, a sovereignty norm born out of the tumult of the world wars 
which treats borders as inviolable. On the other hand, there is the norm 
of self-determination, a liberal norm that now obliges the international 
community to assist nations in controlling their political destiny. One 
norm implies that borders should not be changed; the other implies that 
stateless nations should be able to change them. The resulting efforts to 
balance these competing demands can be summed up by the question: 
who counts? Who counts for the fullest expression of self-determination, 
and who does not? Answering that question is complicated by the fact 
that nations are fuzzy, overlapping, and protean categories.
Since 1945 the question of “who counts” has been answered in 
several ways (Grant, 1999; Crawford, 2006). The first way (or path to 
independence) is via state consent, depicted in Figure 2, where the 
central government permits the secession and recognises the aspiring 
nation (e.g., Montenegro). This is an uncontroversial path insofar as 
it requires little from third parties – the decision has been worked out 
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domestically – and it is an almost guaranteed ticket to independence. 
The second path to independence is decolonisation, a process that took 
hold in the 1960s and gave independence to 1st order administrative 
units of saltwater empires, a specific formulation designed to answer 
the question of “who counts?” in the context of colonialism. The third 
path was that of dissolution, a solution that was created during the 
Yugoslav and Soviet breakups. Like decolonisation, this was in part a 
legal solution meant to create a conceptual distinction between cases 
of dissolution and other forms of secession. Once again, the question 
of “who counts?” was paramount. Potential answers to that same 
question have been hinted at in recent developments in places like 
Kosovo; is the recognition regime moving toward a position where 
nations suffering human rights abuses at the hand of the state now have 
a remedial right to independence? Do proper standards of governance 
allow desiring nations to earn their sovereignty? Finally, does the Scottish 
referendum mean that states might begin to give nations the choice of 
independence? 
Figure 2: Paths to independence
Consent Independence
Decolonization
Dissolution
Remedial Right
Earned Sovereignty
Right to Choose
The international recognition regime should be seen as a work in 
progress. The sovereign tradition promotes stability just as the liberal 
tradition accepts transformation. The resulting set of norms, rules, and 
practices evolve as the international system evolves. It is set against this 
background that individual states decide how to respond to internal 
demands for independence.
The calculus of states
When responding to secessionist demands, states engage in a kind 
of cost-benefit analysis. There are many reasons for denying such 
demands. The territory and its inhabitants may be an economic 
asset because of the resources on it and/or because of its economic 
base. The territory may be valuable for security reasons, especially in 
conflict-prone regions. Moreover, the territory may carry a symbolic 
value that resonates with the national myth of the core population. 
These are all regularly given explanations for why states fight to 
deny secession and retain territory. However, it is only true part of 
the time, for states often fight long and costly wars to retain low-
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value territories, as the Russian government has with Chechnya, 
or permitted the independence of valuable regions, as the Czech 
government did with Slovakia, and as the British government was 
prepared to do with Scotland. There is a larger strategic calculation 
that guides the response of states.
The issue of precedent setting is a key factor in the calculus of states. It 
explains why states will fight to retain a low-value territory and then turn 
around and permit the independence of a high-value territory. States 
permit secession if the loss of the territory does not threaten the core 
(Walter, 2009; Griffiths, 2015, 2016). In the context of secession, the 
precedent setting problem is salient when all of the potential secessionist 
regions see themselves as like types – leading a given group to perceive 
that the permission for another group to secede can be extended to 
them. Apart from a blanket denial, there is only one way out of this 
problem for fissiparous states with many potential internal movements: 
to reify the perception of difference. To say that this nation is classified 
in a different way, that they have a special administrative status, that 
they alone can secede because of a conceptual distinction. The more 
salient that distinction in the eyes of the relevant parties, the more likely 
secession becomes. Although such distinctions nearly always coincide 
with administrative lines and categories, they can be bolstered through 
long conflicts that gradually create the impression that this region is 
different.
There is thus a close relationship between the calculus of states and the 
international recognition regime. States will permit secession if they can 
put a bulwark between one region and the rest. The normative conflict 
at the heart of the international recognition regime requires a similar 
bulwark to separate the deserving from the rest. The motivations are 
not quite the same: self-preservation is the greater imperative for states; 
the international system is freer to encourage liberal notions like self-
determination. But the solution is the same – emphasising difference to 
answer the question of “who counts?”
The strategy of secession
All of this has implications for the strategy of secession. The objective 
of a secessionist movement is to become an internationally recognised 
sovereign state (see Figure 3). To gain recognition, a movement must 
either: (1) Convince their home state to permit independence; or, (2) 
Convince the international community to either apply pressure on the 
central government or circumvent its wishes entirely by recognising the 
aspiring nation. The first approach is where the movement removes the 
home state veto, the single biggest obstacle to obtaining independence 
(Osterud, 1997). The second approach takes the form of the end run, 
going around the home state to bring the international community into 
the game. Although most movements use both approaches in tandem, 
the attractiveness and utility of the end run depends on the position 
of the home state; where the home state is willing to negotiate and, 
indeed, even permit an independence referendum, the end run becomes 
unnecessary; where the home state is uncompromising and potentially 
willing to suppress the secessionists, the end run rises in importance. 
Taken in full, this is the strategy of secession.
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Both approaches are shaped by the international recognition regime and 
the calculations of states. The first approach is the pathway of consent: 
getting the home state to remove its veto. The possibility of obtaining 
consent increases in relation to the perception of difference. The British 
government was prepared to permit Scottish independence because 
it did not anticipate that a contagion effect would ripple through the 
English countryside. Scotland was different. In contrast, the Spanish 
government does not have the same latitude over Catalonia given the 
absence of a clear bulkhead between it and, say, the Basque Country. Of 
course, such differences can over time be obtained through asymmetric 
devolution and/or protracted conflict that gradually create the perception 
that this region is unique.
Figure 3: The strategy of secession
Independence  
Movement
Home 
State
International 
Community
International 
Recognition
Remove the 
Home State Veto
End Rum
International 
Presure Bypass the 
Home State
Consent
The second approach leverages the coercive and transformative 
power of the international system. It works by grafting the narrative 
of a given secessionist movement onto one of the pathways 
to independence by arguing that it should count given the rules 
surrounding decolonisation, by arguing that its state has dissolved 
or committed human rights abuses, by showing that it has earned 
its sovereignty, or by appealing to the democratic right to choose. At 
their core, these are all rhetorical arguments for why a specific nation, 
contrary to the rest, should count. 
Why do governments deny secession in some cases but not others? 
The answer is because they can: the costs are low and the danger of 
contagion is controlled. The referenced region has somehow answered 
the question of “who counts?” by showing that they are unique. This is 
a fundamental issue in the dynamics of secession. It sits at the heart of 
the international recognition regime, it is a critical issue for states, and it 
is a guiding principle in the strategy of secession.
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Introduction
We live at a time when the question of secession is at the forefront of 
international attention. As well as the current focus on Catalonia, the 
subject of Kurdish independence is also in the news. Meanwhile, the 
question of Scottish independence remains firmly on the agenda, despite 
the referendum that took place in 2014. Elsewhere around the world, 
there are anywhere up to a hundred other groups and territories seeking 
statehood.
Although significant attention is paid to the ways in which secessionist 
territories pursue their ambitions for independence, there has been rather 
less attention given to the way states facing an act of unilateral secession 
respond to such challenges. In many ways, the small eastern Mediterranean 
island of Cyprus has set the standard for states facing a secessionist threat. 
Over the course of the last thirty years, the Cypriot government has been 
engaged in a relentless – and, it must be said, often ruthless – battle to 
prevent the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TNRC)” (or Northern 
Cyprus, as it is more commonly known), from gaining international 
recognition. By most benchmarks, these efforts have been extremely 
successful. While some international measures have been taken to ease 
the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, especially after the failed reunification 
attempt in 2004, Northern Cyprus still has relatively little interaction 
with the wider world. In analysing the ways the Cypriot government has 
responded to the TRNC, it becomes clear that any successful counter-
secession strategy is based on four separate but interlocking strands. 
The Cyprus problem
In 1960, the small Mediterranean island of Cyprus became independent 
after 82 years of British colonial rule. A complex constitution was put 
in place that balanced power between the majority Greek Cypriots, 
representing 78% of the population, and the small Turkish Cypriot 
community representing 18% of the island’s inhabitants. (The final 4% was 
made up of three small religious communities: the Maronites, Armenians 
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and Latins.) Meanwhile, the sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity of the new state were guaranteed by the United Kingdom, Greece 
and Turkey. Despite hopes that the new state could work, the power-
sharing agreement soon broke down. In December 1963, fighting erupted. 
This led to the creation of a United Nations peacekeeping force (UNFICYP). 
However, the Turkish Cypriots had ceased to be a part of the government 
structures and the Republic of Cyprus had effectively become a Greek 
Cypriot entity.
During the ten years that followed, Cyprus was relatively calm. Tensions 
between the two communities subsided as the Turkish Cypriots withdrew 
into enclaves. This was broken when, in July 1974, the Greek government 
ordered a coup to overthrow the country’s leader with the hope of uniting 
Greece and Cyprus. In response, Turkey ordered a military invasion of 
the island. After a month of heavy fighting Cyprus was left divided. 
At first, the stated plan of the Turkish Cypriots was to pursue a federal 
settlement. In 1977, the United Nations brokered an agreement between 
the leaders of the two communities that any future settlement would 
be based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation. This was reconfirmed in 
1979. However, on 15 November 1983, the Turkish Cypriot authorities, 
seizing on political turmoil in Turkey, unilaterally declared independence, 
announcing the creation of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”. 
Turkey immediately recognised the new state. However, the move was just 
as quickly condemned by the UN Security Council, which declared the UDI 
illegal and called on states not to recognise the Turkish Cypriot entity. And 
no country has done so. Meanwhile, the UN has continued with its efforts 
to reunite the island. In 2004, a major initiative led to a referendum on 
reunification, which was rejected by the Greek Cypriots. The latest two-year 
effort collapsed in July 2017 following almost two weeks of intensive talks 
in the Swiss mountain resort of Crans-Montana.
The four pillars of the counter-secession strategy
Ever since the Turkish Cypriots declared independence, the government 
of Cyprus has gone to extraordinary lengths to ensure that the TRNC is 
neither officially recognised nor unofficially accepted on the world stage. 
In doing so, it is utterly uncompromising in its approach. No move, no 
matter how small, that could in any way be understood to amount to 
an “upgrading” of the Turkish Cypriot state can pass unchallenged. 
As one diplomat once noted, it is as if they have an army of officials 
watching for any move that suggests that the Turkish Cypriot state 
is gaining recognition. He was not far wrong. The entire diplomatic 
machinery of the republic is geared up to watch out for anything that 
could be understood to amount to legitimisation of the Turkish Cypriot 
entity. In broader terms, the Greek Cypriot approach is built around four 
elements. In many ways, these have become a blueprint for any other 
territory seeking to counter an attempt by part of its territory to secede. 
1) Maintain the claim to territory
The first element of any counter-secession strategy is to ensure that the 
world knows that the attempted secession is unacceptable. As Sir Hersch 
Lauterpacht, the esteemed international lawyer, once observed, while 
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a state facing an act of secession may tacitly accept that a territory has 
been lost, it will often wait decades to acknowledge this reality in formal 
terms. This means that other countries will often watch how the parent 
state (as the state from which the territory is seceding is most usually 
known) reacts to an act of secession when deciding how they should 
respond to the situation. If it appears as if the parent state has accepted 
the secession, and is merely waiting to recognise the new state of affairs, 
it is more likely that other states will chose to recognise it, or at least 
interact with it freely. For this reason, the most important first step is 
to challenge the purported secession and indicate clearly and in no 
uncertain terms that it has an ongoing claim to the territory.
There are numerous ways in which a parent state can indicate its 
opposition to a declaration of independence. Perhaps the most 
obvious is to issue a decree or a parliamentary resolution annulling 
the purported secession. For extra measure, the ringleaders may be 
charged with treason. Both actions send out a clear message. Beyond 
this, the emphasis must be on maintaining that the territory is still 
considered to be an integral part of the state. In the case of Cyprus, this 
is done in many ways. For instance, there are still MPs in the parliament 
representing the areas “under occupation”. However, it also goes far 
further than this. Cyprus even maintains local councils for these districts. 
Of course, these are only skeletal bodies with no actual territorial 
responsibilities. However, the fact that they even exist sends out the 
message that the state still regards the areas they represent or “govern” 
as essential and inalienable parts of their sovereign territory.
2) Prevent recognition
The second element of the strategy is the most obvious: to prevent other 
states from formally recognising the breakaway territory, and stop the 
territory from joining international organisations. In this task, parent 
states are aided by the deep aversion of the international community 
to accepting unilateral acts of secession. In fact, since 1945, only one 
country has seceded without permission and gained full international 
recognition: Bangladesh. However, even in this case, it only joined the 
UN after it had been recognised by Pakistan. Every other secessionist 
territory has fared far worse. Even Kosovo, which seceded from Serbia in 
2008, and is widely regarded as the most successful contemporary act of 
unilateral secession, has only been recognised by a little over half of the 
members of the United Nations a decade later. While it has been able 
to join some international organisations, full UN membership is highly 
unlikely for the foreseeable future due to objections from Russia and 
China.
However, while states are extremely reluctant to recognise unilateral acts 
of secession, it is still important for parent states to make their case. This 
requires an active diplomatic campaign. However, this can be expensive 
and beyond the means of many countries. In such cases, states need to 
concentrate their firepower where it will achieve the most results. In this 
context, the UN General Assembly can often be a vital chance to engage 
with as many other states as possible. Meetings of other international 
and regional bodies can also be ideal opportunities to lobby. For Cyprus, 
its membership of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) gave it access to 
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many developing countries. Although it had to relinquish membership 
of the NAM when it joined the European Union, EU membership has 
proven to be an incredibly powerful tool in the Cypriot counter-secession 
efforts. It seems highly unlikely that any country would recognise the 
TRNC knowing that it would face inevitable and strong consequences in 
terms of its relations with the EU.
3) Stop legitimisation
While stopping formal recognition is a key plank of any counter-
recognition strategy, states also need to guard against the gradual 
acceptance of a breakaway territory on the international stage. In some 
ways, this is really a far bigger problem than recognition. Speaking 
to Cypriot officials, they do not believe that the TRNC will ever gain 
widespread formal recognition. One or two states may recognise it, but 
it will never join the UN. What worries them far more is that it will slowly 
become a de facto reality and that it will gain recognition in all but 
name. 
Such creeping legitimisation can happen in all sorts of ways. And 
nothing is seemingly too small to oppose. For example, there have been 
many occasions when word has leaked that a major international singer 
is booked to perform in Northern Cyprus, at which point a concerted 
effort is made to persuade them to abandon their performance. In 
this effort, the government is often supported by the vast army of the 
Cypriot diaspora, which is often happy to use its influence to persuade 
the hapless pop star to back down. However, acceptance can come in 
all sorts of other ways, such as allowing Turkish Cypriot sportsmen and 
women to compete in competitions, or even through cultural visits. It is 
telling just how utterly determined the Cypriot government is when it 
comes to such matters. 
4) Pursue legal avenues
The fourth main strand of any counter-secession strategy is the use 
of legal avenues to prevent the recognition of breakaway territories. 
Perhaps the most obvious such example was the decision of the Serbian 
government to refer Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence 
to the International Court of Justice. While the Cypriot government 
participated in this process, and made a strong case against Kosovo, 
it has so far refrained from taking such a high-profile course of action 
itself. This is largely because it has no need to do so. UN Security 
Council Resolution 541 (1983), passed at the time of the Turkish Cypriot 
declaration of independence, provides all the necessary cover. As one 
Cypriot official noted to the author, international courts can be very 
unpredictable bodies. The risk of taking a case before such bodies unless 
necessary is just too high.
However, Cyprus has shown how international courts can be extremely 
important in counter-secession efforts in other ways. Perhaps the best 
example was a case brought before the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) by a Greek Cypriot refugee. The court ruled that the 
refugee had not only been illegally deprived of the rightful use of her 
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land, it also noted that Northern Cyprus is under Turkish occupation. This 
was a huge victory for the Greek Cypriots. In one fell swoop, the ECHR 
not only further undermined any claim to legitimacy by the TRNC, it also 
reinforced the Greek Cypriot message that Northern Cyprus is not a 
product of Turkish Cypriot self-determination, but is the result of external 
military aggression. It is a message that other states facing secessionist 
challenges, such as Georgia, have also sought to emulate. 
Present and future counter-secession efforts
While the Cypriot government has had remarkable success in its 
efforts to prevent the recognition or legitimation of Northern Cyprus – 
especially considering the size and diplomatic clout of Turkey, the TRNC’s 
main patron – there has undoubtedly been a change in international 
attitudes towards the Turkish Cypriots over the years. Perhaps the 
most significant development was the Greek Cypriot rejection of the 
2004 UN proposal for reunification. Although this did not lead to any 
formal recognitions, as some Greek Cypriots claimed could happen, it 
did change wider international attitudes towards the Turkish Cypriots. 
The EU moved to open trade with them, although plans for direct trade 
were thwarted by Greek Cypriots. At the same time, the Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) upgraded the standing of the “Turkish Cypriot 
state”, and has called on its members to increase their economic and 
cultural contacts with the Turkish Cypriots. Meanwhile, the election of 
a more moderate leadership in the north has also seen more diplomats 
accredited to the Republic of Cyprus crossing the line that divides 
the two communities and engaging with Turkish Cypriot officials 
and political figures – much to the evident annoyance of the Cypriot 
government. Certainly, Northern Cyprus is far less isolated today than it 
was fifteen or twenty years ago.
But in so many other ways, the Turkish Cypriots remain cut off from the 
wider international community. As noted, the prospects of any further 
recognitions remain dim, even after the collapse of the latest UN talks. 
Of course, it is always possible that some state might be persuaded to 
take the plunge. However, it seems unlikely that many would really do 
so. The costs would be too high. Also, repeated efforts to try to ease 
the position of the Turkish Cypriots in other ways fall on deaf ears. 
There is little prospect that Turkish Cypriot football clubs will be allowed 
to compete in international competitions. This in fact highlights the 
greatest danger now facing the Greek Cypriots. Given that there is 
little prospect that the TRNC will ever be able to ease its isolation, and 
that many Turkish Cypriots now believe that the Greek Cypriots have 
no real desire for reunification, perhaps the only realistic prospect is for 
the north to unite with Turkey. If so, Cyprus will be faced with a rather 
different problem. It will no longer be engaged in counter-secession. It 
will have to formulate a counter-annexation strategy.
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B avaria is a special case in German politics. The state has developed a strong regional identity. And this regional identity finds its political expression not only on the state level, but also on the 
federal level. It would not be surprising if one found a strong political 
movement for Bavarian autonomy or statehood. But the opposite 
is the case. Bavaria sees itself as a paragon of cultural, educational 
and economic success in a federal state. Why is this the case? Why 
did the strong sense of Bavarian exceptionalism not transmute into 
secessionism? One obvious answer is that there are incentives for 
political actors to play the counter-secessionist card or at least to give 
preference to strategies of political access that provide greater gains 
than outright secessionism. To explain the paradox of efficient regional 
identity politics in a non-secessionist environment this contribution first 
discusses the fate of the Bavarian separatist party, the Bavaria Party (BP). 
It then moves on to an analysis of the politics of the Christian Social 
Union (CSU), the regional party that dominates Bavarian political life and 
has successfully accommodated the conflict between regional autonomy 
and a federal role for Bavaria. Here we find an explanation for the CSU’s 
internal mechanisms of counter-secessionism. 
The separatism that never was
In the post-war years, two Bavarian regional parties competed, the BP 
and the CSU. The BP was and to the present day still is a party that 
advocates a separate statehood for Bavaria (Mintzel, 1983). The CSU 
is an autonomist party fully integrated into the federal framework of 
German politics. The CSU always had a very small separatist fringe 
that did not dare to openly challenge the integrationist mainstream. 
For example, in 2012, the former editor of the party’s newspaper 
Bayernkurier, Winfried Scharnagl, published a book entitled 
Bavaria can stand alone, in which he argued in favour of Bavarian 
independence. To secure internal peace in the party he and a few other 
former leading CSU figures were recruited by the party leadership for 
a federalism reform committee that came to nothing. It is unknown 
whether it ever met. Early supporters of Bavarian secessionism in the 
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CSU were turncoats from the BP with no influence on party politics. 
Some of the CSU separatists combined their secessionism with the idea 
of bringing back the Bavarian monarchy – a thought that only found 
some resonance in the Bavarian south, the old Bavaria, consisting 
of the Bavarian districts Upper Bavaria, Lower Bavaria and Upper 
Palatinate. 
The BP’s narrative is that Bavaria was tricked into the German Reich of 
1871 and ever since Bavaria has been dominated by Prussians. Prussian 
militarism caused two World Wars and made the Bavarians suffer. For 
example, they lost their province of Palatinate. The problem for the BP 
was, however, that their image of Bavaria was not shared by all Bavarian 
districts. The electorate in the districts outside old Bavaria – Swabia and 
Franconia – had only to a limited extent the Catholic and agricultural 
background of the BP’s electorate. These districts were also latecomers 
to the state of Bavaria with their own dialects and history. For them 
the BP’s animosity towards large companies and Germany as the big 
centraliser was less attractive. 
In the post-war years autonomists had a real choice between two parties 
that were both exclusive to Bavaria: one was the CSU, which also played 
a role in the national government, and the other was the BP, which 
fought an uphill struggle against Bavarian integration into Germany. 
The BP was disadvantaged in this struggle because it got its license as a 
political party from the Allied forces only after the CSU had received its 
own. In early 1946, while the CSU was allowed to function as a political 
party, the BP did not receive permission until March 1948. All post-war 
Bavarian parties had stressed the need for a federal order in Germany 
that gave maximum autonomy to Bavaria. The idea of a separate 
Bavarian presidency was only narrowly defeated (Baer, 1971: 57). In the 
Bavarian constitution of 1946 a two-chamber parliament with a senate 
organised along the lines of Catholic social thought was guaranteed. No 
other German state had a second chamber. 
The BP’s separatism remained, however, outside the political mainstream, 
and it came too late. As the BP did not exist in 1946, it could not 
influence the debates on the Bavarian constitution. The same is true for 
the German constitution, the Basic Law, because the BP was not part of 
the Bavarian government. Bavaria abstained in the vote on the German 
constitution because it was argued that this constitution did not give 
sufficient autonomy to the states. But at the same time Bavaria accepted 
that in future it would work under the new constitution and would not 
challenge its legitimacy. As Hans Ehard said in 1945 “Bavaria was always 
a part of Germany. It was inconceivable to think of a Germany without 
Bavaria. Bavaria will always remain a part of Germany” (Gallwas, 1999: 
89).1 In the negotiations on the future German constitution Bavaria 
was represented by the first elected Bavarian government of 1946. The 
CSU had formed a coalition with the Social Democrats (SPD) and the 
Economic Reconstruction Association (WAV). Hans Ehard became the 
CSU’s first Bavarian head of government.
The history of the BP and the CSU is one of fierce competition, of 
politicians moving from one party to the other, of attacks on the 
reputation of political representatives, of abuse of administrative powers 
to exclude the political competitors and of a perjury trial in 1959 that 1. Author’s own translation.
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efficiently “decapitated” the BP leadership (Mintzel, 1983: 406). The 
BP’s charismatic leaders Joseph Baumgartner and August Geislhöringer 
were sent to jail. The CSU had surreptitiously orchestrated the 
“casino scandal” that was behind the court’s decision. The party then 
successfully monopolised the interpretation of Bavarian identity, and 
merged its presence in government with an exclusive grip on Bavarian 
politics (Hepburn, 2008). Table 1 illustrates the electoral consequences 
of the struggle for the crown of the true Bavarian party. The BP started 
as a serious rival to the CSU. In the 1950 election the BP reduced the 
CSU’s share of the vote by almost 50%. This was, however, the best 
ever result for the party. What followed was a steady decline in electoral 
fortunes. Since 1966 the BP has no longer been represented in the 
Bavarian Parliament (Landtag). It is now less than a minor party, although 
it “represents” Bavarian secessionism. This demonstrates in other words 
that secessionism was never a real political force in Bavaria. It was, for 
a short time, a contested topic. Today there is a not even a discourse of 
any relevance on Bavarian separatism.  
 
Table 1: Election results: BP and CSU votes in %. Elections to the Bavarian parliament
Year CSU BP
1946 52.3 (absolute majority of seats) Not yet licensed
1950 27.4 17.9
1954 38.0 13.2
1958 45.6 8.1
1962 47.5 (absolute majority of seats) 4.8
1966 48.1 (absolute majority of seats) 3.4
1970 56.4 (absolute majority of seats) 1.3
1974 62.1 (absolute majority of seats) 0.8
1978 59.1 (absolute majority of seats) 0.4
1982 58.3 (absolute majority of seats) 0.5
1986 55.8 (absolute majority of seats) 0.6
1990 54.9 (absolute majority of seats) 0.8
1994 52.8 (absolute majority of seats) 1.0
1998 52.9 (absolute majority of seats) 0.7
2003 60.7 (absolute majority of seats) 0.8
2008 43.4 1.1
2013 47.7 (absolute majority of seats) 2.1
Source: Bayerisches Landesamt für Statistik and Hirscher, 2012.
The CSU: Counter-secessionism via the political 
integration strategies of autonomists
There is a widespread misunderstanding that what the CSU wants 
is more autonomy for Bavaria or a greater decentralisation of 
state powers in Germany (Hepburn and Hough, 2011: 79). This 
misunderstanding is nurtured by the party itself and its self-styled role 
as champion of federalism. The CSU is, indeed, a separate political 
entity, but its purpose is a role in national politics. To secure such 
a role it uses its regional base. Here it needs to be successful. No 
matter what the CSU’s allies in the CDU – its conservative sister party 
outside Bavaria – want, the CSU will always have only one priority: 
an absolute majority of seats in the Bavarian parliament. This makes 
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the CSU an awkward partner for the conservatives in the rest of 
Germany at least as long as the Bavarian electorate has preferences 
different from the ones of Germany as a whole. Symbolic gestures 
of anti-Berlin politics may help to close the regional ranks but should 
not be misunderstood as an expression of autonomist politics. The 
overarching aim of the CSU is not to strengthen the separate political 
existence of a Bavarian polity. On the contrary, over the years German 
federalism has become more centralised and unitary in character with 
the help and support of the Bavarian government (Sturm, 2013a; 
Sturm, 2015). 
The key question for the CSU is how to organise maximum political 
success in Bavaria. One precondition is that it has no conservative rival 
in Bavaria. From start, the CDU and the CSU agreed not to compete at 
elections. This means in practical terms that the CDU only exists outside 
Bavaria and the CSU restricts itself to the territory of Bavaria. Though 
in the years of Franz Josef Strauss – a CSU party leader with national 
popularity – there were initiatives from outside Bavaria for an all-
German CSU, the party leadership hesitated to support this idea. After 
German unification, the CSU seemed to be in a more difficult situation 
because, on paper, with an increase of the electorate it could become 
more difficult for the CSU to pass the 5% hurdle for membership in the 
German parliament at federal elections. The party leadership toyed with 
the idea of an East German partner, the DSU. The fear that the CDU 
would retaliate with a Bavarian branch stopped further efforts. Another 
threat to the dominant role of the CSU were the parties to the right of 
the CDU – the Republicans in the 1980s and today the Alternative für 
Deutschland (AfD). Today, as in the past, the CSU reacts to the challenge 
from the right by offering the voters a manifesto that includes the major 
demands of such right-wing challenger parties. This may estrange the 
party from the CDU, as for example with regard to the question of  a 
maximum number of migrants Germany should welcome, but more 
importantly for the party such a strategy helps solidify the approval rates 
for the CSU.
The second problem for the party is to find an optimal solution for the 
management of the party in the capital and in Bavaria. The key here 
is the best possible allocation of power centres on the federal and the 
Land level (Kießling, 2004; Sturm, 2013b). The party has to make two 
strategic decisions. One is whether the party chairman (so far no woman 
has held the post) should accept a ministerial post in Berlin (before 
Berlin it was Bonn) or should sit in Munich. A second decision to be 
made is whether the chairman of the party and the head of government 
(Ministerpräsident) should be the same person or there should be 
different people for the two jobs. If the Ministerpräsident is at the same 
time party chairman the CSU’s man or woman in the capital heads the 
influential CSU Landesgruppe (land faction in the conservatives’ joint 
parliamentary party). The Landesgruppe has a right to veto the decisions 
of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party in the national parliament. The 
fact that strategic decisions, which include the federal level of German 
politics, are so central to the party’s strategic options demonstrates again 
that the CSU is not a party with an exclusive regional and autonomist 
focus. Its fabric always combines the national and the regional outlook. 
Given the choices mentioned for the CSU this leaves us with the options 
listed in table 2.
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Table 2: The strategic choices for the CSU to combine Bavarian and national politics
Options Power centres Examples
1
Party chairman in federal capital (cabinet)/
Bavarian head of government
1962–1978 Franz Josef 
Strauss/Alfons Goppel; 
1988–1993 Theo Waigel/
Max Streibl; 1994–1998 
Theo Waigel/Edmund 
Stoiber
2
Party chairman in Munich/ Bavarian head of 
government
1946–1949 Josef Müller/
Hans Ehard; 2008 Erwin 
Huber/Günter Beckstein 
3
One person in Munich is both party chairman 
and Bavarian head of government
1949–1954 Hans Ehard; 
1957–1960 Hanns Seidel; 
1978–1988 Franz Josef 
Strauss; 1999–2007 
Edmund Stoiber; since 
2008 Horst Seehofer
Source: Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (1995) and author’s own data.
What is the best strategy for a regional party with national ambitions? 
History does not tell us. The CSU has tried all three options. Many 
of the effects of the option chosen depended on personalities, 
and all three options have advantages and disadvantages. It is, 
however, obvious that none of these options led to demands for 
greater autonomy for Bavaria. The challenge for the CSU remained 
how to remain an influential force in national politics and at the 
same time to be authentically Bavarian and able to win absolute 
majorities in Bavarian elections. Option 1 seems to offer the most 
far-reaching degree of nationalisation for a regional party. With 
the party heavyweights Franz-Josef Strauss (defence minister in the 
cabinet of Konrad Adenauer and finance minister in the cabinet 
of Kurt-Georg Kiesinger) and Theo Waigel (finance minister in the 
cabinet of Helmut Kohl) the CSU got a lot of attention as a national 
party. This model could only work, however, with a father figure as 
head of the regional government in Bavaria. Only the combination of 
both guaranteed electoral success at Land elections. During Alfons 
Goppel’s time in office as Bavarian Ministerpräsident his regional 
popularity worked well to secure support for the CSU even if the 
party chairman was restricted by cabinet discipline when he sought 
confrontation with the Bonn government. This successful model did 
not work well when Theo Waigel was chairman of the party. His first 
partner as Ministerpräsident in Bavaria, Max Streibl, did not succeed 
in developing a fatherly image as office holder. He lost office because 
of a corruption scandal. His successor Edmund Stoiber also tried to 
consolidate the CSU in Bavaria by provoking conflicts with the party 
chairman. Theo Waigel, as minister of finance, was responsible for 
the introduction of the euro (he even invented its name). As the euro 
was unpopular in Bavaria, Edmund Stoiber attacked its introduction 
and wanted Theo Waigel to resign from the party chair. This conflict 
illuminates the blame game that is possible if the jobs of party 
chairman and Ministerpräsident remain separated. The CSU can at the 
same time be involved in national government decisions and oppose 
these decisions. This blame game can, of course, also be played when 
options two or three are chosen.
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Option 2 is the least attractive for the CSU because it has 
no institutionalised role in national politics and is weakened by 
competing power centres. The party chairman can take part in 
coalition meetings in the capital if the conservatives are part of the 
national government, but he lacks any kind of national electoral 
appeal which could be added to the influence on voters that 
comes from the Ministerpräsident. Option 3, however, empowers 
the party leader, who is at the same time head of government in 
Munich. In this role, he can play the game of outsider to the national 
government and government critic in the name of Bavaria, and at 
the same time if the CSU is in the national coalition he can intervene 
in national politics. Strong Ministerpräsidenten present their Bavaria 
as an example of good government for the whole of Germany. Two 
of them, Franz Josef Strauss in 1980 and Edmund Stoiber in 2002, 
even became the conservative parties’ candidates for the office of 
the Federal Chancellor. This, by the way, is further evidence of the 
counter-secessionist orientation of the CSU.
The international dimension
Contrary to the misunderstanding in the English language literature 
(Hepburn 2010: 540; Padgett and Burkett 1986: 114; etc.) the CSU 
cannot be identified as “separatist” or “autonomist”. The CSU is a 
party with a regional base but national ambitions. This forces the party 
to give priority to the preferences of the Bavarian voter. Otherwise, the 
party would have no chance of winning the landslide election victories 
that are necessary to pass the 5% hurdle nationally for elections to the 
German parliament. The absolute priority of winning regional elections 
can lead to conflicts between the political preferences of Bavaria and the 
Conservatives on the national level. From outside this may look like a 
struggle for autonomy. It is, however, only part of the strategic necessity 
to put Bavaria first in order to stay involved in national politics. The CSU 
has to balance interests on the regional and the national levels, and it 
has tried several models to organise interest intermediation. It is beyond 
doubt, however, that among the strategies chosen we do not find a 
priority for Bavarian autonomy over national integration. 
The party political Bavaria First logic finds its expression in foreign 
policies too. Germany’s cooperative federalism tolerates a parallel 
foreign policy of the German states. In the past, Land governments 
mainly concentrated on efforts to help regional industries abroad. 
They see themselves as door openers for regional investors and offer 
help for foreign direct investment in their states. In recent years, the 
Bavarian government has given its parallel foreign policy an explicitly 
political dimension. In its effort to increase party political support in 
Bavaria the CSU has taken foreign policy initiatives that are in conflict 
with German foreign policy or at least tend to contradict the official 
position of the German government. For example, there are strong 
voices in the CSU’s leadership that advocate a better relationship 
with Russia, not least for economic reasons. The Bavarian prime 
minister, Horst Seehofer, accompanied by the former Bavarian prime 
minister, Edmund Stoiber, has visited Vladimir Putin several times. He 
supported the end of sanctions against Russia.2 With Victor Orbán of 
Hungary the Bavarian government shares a critical attitude towards 
2. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/
politik/bundestagswahl/
parteien-und-kandidaten/
die-csu-und-die-aussenpolitik-wie-
horst-seehofer-die-provinzialitaet-
abstreifen-will-14918807.html 
(21.10. 2017).
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Angela Merkel’s refugee policies. The Bavarian government has 
established a close relationship with the Visegrád countries and tends 
to play down democratic deficits in Poland and Hungary. In Bavaria, 
the foreign policy dissent with Berlin is not seen as a problem – it may 
not be a decisive vote-winning device. But it has the double advantage 
of securing regional interests (economic ones, and the interest in 
keeping refugees out) and of demonstrating to the Bavarian voter 
that the CSU defends Bavarian interests even if this means (low-level) 
conflict with the national government.   
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Introduction 
Debates about secession and counter-secession often focus on questions 
of identity, political history, and legal rights. Yet economic grievances 
and perceived opportunities are as important if not more so in secession 
and counter-secession strategies. They were powerful drivers of the 
decolonisation processes of the 20th century that were responsible for 
most of the new state formations in history. More recently, secessionist 
movements have claimed that their territories are being shortchanged in 
current political formations and that independence would carry financial 
rewards. The Lega Nord, the Flemish nationalists, and the Catalan 
secessionists are all cases in point.
Economic issues also play a crucial role in counter-secession strategies. 
To prevent the secession of a territory, states have provided economic 
enticements in the form of prestige projects, market access, and transfer 
payments. They have also used negative sanctions, be they boycotting, 
blockading by military means, or isolating a territory internationally, 
thereby threatening to exclude it from trade deals and investment 
opportunities.
This chapter first discusses economic countermeasures outside of Europe, 
namely against the process of decolonisation that led to a steep increase 
in newly independent states after World War II and economic sticks and 
carrots that have been used in non-colonial counter-secession strategies. It 
then dedicates a special section to the European Union, where economic 
aspects and trade issues have played a crucial role in independence 
aspirations and counter-secession strategies alike. 
Economic sticks and carrots in counter-secession 
outside Europe
Decolonisation accounted for a surge in independent states after World 
War II. The number of independent states hovered around 50 from 1850 
to 1950 and then shot up to above 150 at the end of the 1970s. India 
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(1947), Vietnam (1954) and Egypt (1954) were notable examples. 
Ghana (1957) launched the independence drive in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
which accounted for a majority of new states in the postwar decades. 
Decolonisation had important economic drivers. Its proponents 
decried the exploitation of their natural and human resources and the 
systematic underdevelopment of their territories, while their peoples 
enjoyed no or only limited political participation to decide over their 
fate. Local elites who felt their ascendance was blocked or feared 
relative decline began to develop narratives of national liberation that 
were based on newly “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1983). Over 
time they drew in broader segments of the population and cultivated 
social bases of support. In such cases nationalism became a mass 
phenomenon.
The economic side of the decolonisation narrative focused on the 
importance of industry for economic development, and the need 
to foster “infant industries” with protectionist policies. It was not 
dissimilar to the narratives of catch-up development that Friedrich List 
and Alexander Hamilton propagated in Germany and the USA in the 
19th century, when both countries were economic latecomers (Chang, 
2002). In more recent times Asian development states, such as China 
and South Korea, opted for this kind of state intervention before 
gradually engineering an opening-up via export promotion.
Colonial policies used economic pressures to fight secession 
movements. India for example was by far the most important colony 
to the British Empire. Many British political and military initiatives 
circled around safeguarding transportation routes to India, whether it 
was the Suez Canal, the build-up of a chain of protectorates around 
the coastlines of the Arabian Peninsula, or the Great Game with 
Russia over influence in Iran. The agitation of the Congress Party for 
independence put arch-colonialists like Churchill on high alert. When 
the Bengal famine of 1943 erupted and British authorities in India 
asked for urgent famine relief, he quipped: if food was so scarce “why 
Gandhi hadn’t died yet” (Mishra, 2007). The famine killed about 3 
million people and was caused by war-related inflation, bureaucratic 
neglect, and racial prejudice. In a crude way it served Churchill’s 
counter-secessionist strategy. It also helped a recruitment drive of 
the British military that enlisted about 5 million soldiers from its 
colonial possessions during World War II, as Bengali recruits opted for 
enlistment to escape famine and possible death. 
Beside economic pressures and hardship, colonial counter-secession 
strategies also used incentives. In the late 1950s France tried to prevent 
the independence of Algeria, whose northern part was actually not 
a colony, but legally part of France. The Plan de Constantine (1959–
63) envisaged spending on infrastructure, education, and industrial 
development. “All of Algeria must have her share in what modern 
civilization can and must bring to men”, declared de Gaulle when 
announcing the plan in 1958 (Davis, 2010). However, it was too little 
too late to appease the people of a country that was impoverished, 
grappling with growing shantytowns since the 1920s, and had seen its 
traditional socioeconomic structures destroyed. The plan was unable to 
prevent the eventual independence of Algeria in 1962.
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Apart from conscious political secession and counter-secession 
strategies, economic logic worked in favour of decolonisation, too: The 
urge to colonise faded with diminishing economic incentives. The costs 
of colonialism increased with the dissemination of military technology 
that reduced the advantage of empires. Further capital accumulation 
and productivity gains favoured influencing terms of trade and guiding 
the global commons over holding actual territory for the exploitation of 
raw materials (Gartzke and Rohner, 2011). 
The politics of economic sticks and carrots of colonial counter-secession 
strategies can be found in non-colonial contexts, too. During the 
American civil war Unionists imposed a naval blockade on southern 
ports, thereby ruining the cotton export industry of the largely rural 
south. From 1863 Unionist control of the Mississippi also blocked cattle 
exports from Texas and Arkansas to eastern parts of the Confederacy. 
The decline in interregional trade and food imports led to shortages 
and bread riots in a number of southern cities.
Stopping short of outright blockade there are other means of negative 
economic counter-secession measures, such as cutting payments by 
the central government, stopping supplies of crucial utilities, such 
as electricity, or pointing to the negative repercussions of economic 
exclusion from existing trade arrangements: the Kurdistan Region in 
Iraq, Crimea, and Quebec provide some illustrations.
The federal government in Baghdad has had only limited influence 
in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) since the latter gained semi-
autonomous status in 1991. Oil is the most crucial source of 
government revenues in KRI and the rest of Iraq alike. Baghdad has 
sought to curb the independence drive in KRI by blocking a pending 
oil law and sanctioning international oil companies that have invested 
in the oil sector in KRI. In 2014 it stopped KRI’s share of the federal 
budget and its oil receipts completely. KRI on the other hand has built 
its own oil infrastructure with a bespoke pipeline for oil exports via 
Turkey.
When Russia intervened in Crimea and engineered a secession 
of the territory from Ukraine, including a managed referendum, 
a considerable challenge in terms of utilities and transportation 
infrastructure arose. Most of Crimea’s electricity supplies used to 
come via the Ukrainian mainland until unknown people blew up the 
transmission lines and the Ukrainian government showed little urgency 
in repairing them. As a result Russia has faced the challenge of building 
new power plants on Crimea under international embargo conditions.
Economic counter-secession arguments played a role when Quebec 
launched its referendums on secession in 1980 and 1995 (see André 
Lecours’ chapter in this volume). In 1980 the federal government 
of Canada warned that an independent Quebec would end up 
impoverished and cut off from its most important market – the rest 
of Canada. In 1995 secessionist forces tried to disperse such concerns 
by arguing that Ottawa would come up with a deal of economic and 
political partnership in the wake of a positive secession vote. They saw 
their economic position strengthened in the wake of the NAFTA trade 
deal, which had made Quebec less dependent on the rest of Canada 
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for trade. However, US diplomats signalled that an independent 
Quebec would not remain in NAFTA and would need to reapply for 
membership. 
Since then the economic “Montreal effect” has left a sobering imprint 
on any renewed independence aspirations: Since the 1990s more and 
more companies have moved their headquarters from Montreal to 
other Canadian cities, such as Toronto, Calgary, and Vancouver. Such 
moves were spurred by more business friendly legislation in other 
municipalities, the growth of trade with Asia, and the importance 
of English in an increasingly globalised business environment, but 
also by the political and legal uncertainty in the wake of Quebec 
independence agitation (Lo and Teixeira, 1998; Lamman, 2013). 
More often than not, economic counter-secession measures also 
include positive incentives which can, however, have ambiguous 
impacts, such as reconstruction, new infrastructure, prestige projects, 
and trade deals. Chechnya, Turkey, and China can serve as examples. 
After the wholesale destructions of the two Chechen wars of 1994–96 
and 1999 Russia embarked on a reconstruction campaign in 2003. 
Chechnya was reintegrated into Russia and granted limited autonomy 
under the client regime of Ramzan Kadyrov, who came to power in 
2007. The totally destroyed capital Grozny was rebuilt from scratch 
after 2003. Russian foreign minister Lavrov sold it as a possible model 
for any future reconstruction of Aleppo after Russia intervened in the 
Syrian civil war on the side of the Assad regime.
Turkey has sought to develop predominantly Kurdish south-east 
Anatolia with the GAP irrigation project, which includes the gigantic 
Atatürk Dam. GAP has aimed at doubling the irrigated area in Turkey, 
but its main thrust has been electricity generation, often used for 
capital-intensive agribusiness and food processing in specialised 
economic zones. While this might serve to co-opt local elites, the 
economic benefits for the broader population have been less clear. 
Many have been forced to migrate to cities where they can be more 
easily assimilated and controlled, thus complementing displacements 
that have occurred in the wake of conflict and the impounding of the 
dams. 
China has regarded Taiwan as a renegade province since 1949. Its 
One China policy has successfully isolated Taiwan internationally on 
a political level. With the exception of two dozen countries, mainly in 
Latin America and some Pacific islands, no nation recognises Taiwan 
as an independent state today. Military threats between China and 
Taiwan have not been uncommon, but since the 1980s there has been 
a thaw and even close cooperation on an economic level. During the 
2000s Taiwanese exports to China grew steeply, which is by far its 
most important trading partner. In 2010 both countries even signed 
a preferential trade agreement (Rosen and Wang, 2011). The Chinese 
strategy to keep Taiwan in its fold can be read as an important 
counter-secession strategy. China is a major market for Taiwanese 
goods and Taiwan is an investment destination for Chinese companies. 
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Economic counter-secession in the EU
Economic aspects of secession and counter-secession have gained 
increasing importance over the last century. For two reasons this is 
particularly true in the EU: On the one hand the EU defines itself as a 
values and rules-based community; coercive counter-secession measures, 
economic or otherwise, are more likely to be met with international 
disapproval and pressure. Blockades, embargos, and sabotage of 
infrastructure, quite common in different contexts and time periods 
as we have seen above, are not really an option for counter-secession 
strategies within the EU. 
On the other hand membership of the common market, structural 
assistance, transfer payments, and monetary protection measures within 
the eurozone provide a strong incentive to remain part of the nation-
states that form the European Union. The question of continued EU 
membership played an important role in the quests for independence in 
Scotland and Catalonia for example (Muro and Vlaskamp, 2016). 
The costs of leaving the EU are considerable, even for larger countries, 
as the case of Brexit illustrates. The UK will lose unfettered access 
to the largest common market in the world and will become a less 
attractive destination for foreign direct investment that seeks to gain 
a foothold in this common market. It will be more difficult to finance 
its current account deficit, while a depreciating currency and reduced 
labour migration from the EU exert inflationary pressure. Rebuilding the 
administrative capacities that have been hitherto handled on the EU 
level, namely in trade, is also a challenge.
It has been argued that membership of the European Union has made 
secession more palatable for smaller states, as they could break away 
while still maintaining access to a large economic market (Alesina 
and Spolaore, 2005). The treaties of the EU are ambivalent. They do 
not specify what happens to the EU membership of territories that 
secede from their nation states (Guirao, 2016). Before the Scottish 
independence referendum in 2014, Scottish nationalists argued that they 
could maintain EU membership after a successful secession referendum. 
They eyed an “internal enlargement” via Article 48 TEU that deals with 
treaty amendments (Kenealy, 2014). However, with the Prodi doctrine 
the EU stated in 2004 that any territory that breaks away from an 
EU member state would be outside of the union and would need to 
re-apply for membership via Article 49 TEU – a process that normally 
takes years, even in the absence of vetoes by member countries. 
It is probably no coincidence that this legal clarification is named after 
Roman Prodi, the former Italian prime minister from 1996–98 and 
2006–08 and president of the European Commission from 1999–2004. 
With the Lega Nord Italy has seen one of the most prominent secession 
movements within the EU. The Lega Nord was founded in 1991. It has 
advocated more political and fiscal federalism and greater regional 
autonomy for Italy’s prosperous north; between 1996 and 1998, in 
particular, that included the propagation of independence of “Padania”, 
as the northern region is called by secessionist advocates (McDonnell, 
2006).
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Italy is a net payer into the EU budget, so withdrawal from the EU would 
not carry as high costs for “Padania” as for a net recipient, such as 
Catalonia, which is part of Spain. But beside payments to structurally 
weaker countries and regions, membership of the EU also provides 
access to the world’s largest single market and monetary protection 
mechanisms for the eurozone members – factors that are not easily 
discarded, especially after economic turbulence in the wake of the global 
financial crisis of 2008. Given the economic costs of exiting the EU, the 
EU might rather hinder secessionist strategies than enabling them.
EU membership is indeed vastly popular among Catalans, less so 
among the Scots, and has played a prominent role in discussions 
about independence. In the years prior to the Catalan referendum on 
October 1st 2017, which Spain’s Constitutional Court declared illegal 
and unionist forces boycotted, leaders of the secessionist camp were 
adamant that an independent Catalonia would be able to stay in the 
European Union or could accede to it after a short period of time. They 
felt that if that were not going to be the case, support for secession 
would wane. Countervailing evidence and statements by the European 
Union were brushed aside. “The big umbrella is the European Union … 
within Europe we can have a different political status”, then Catalan 
President Artur Mas declared in 2012.
Scottish nationalists similarly argued during their campaign for the 
independence referendum in 2014 that Scotland would be able to 
maintain EU membership or retransition smoothly into the EU after a 
short period of time. However, European Commission President Jose 
Manuel Barroso cautioned that this would be “extremely difficult, if not 
impossible”, in an attempt to temper such expectations. Proponents of 
British unity used the negative repercussions of potential EU exclusion 
in their campaign. They also denied the request of Scottish nationalists 
for continued use of the British pound after independence. Immediately 
before and after the Catalan referendum the EU made itself even clearer 
than Barroso in 2014, reiterating the basic tenet of the Prodi doctrine: 
that new states would be outside the EU and would need to apply for 
membership.
Re-accession during such an application process could be jeopardised 
by vetoes by any single member state. Such vetoes would be likely. 
Spain might oppose EU membership for an independent Catalonia 
out of spite and because partition of assets, pension liabilities, and 
government debts would likely lead to considerable conflict. Other 
European countries such as France, Belgium, or Italy would oppose it in 
order to discourage secessionist sentiments within their own territories. 
Spain also signalled that it would oppose Scottish EU membership in an 
effort to nip Catalan aspirations in the bud. 
The Spanish government has used the threat of EU exclusion 
prominently in its counter-secession narrative and has sought to use 
the resulting anxiety among Catalan companies to its advantage. 
When Catalonia’s largest bank, La Caixa, could not change its legal 
headquarters without the approval of its general shareholder assembly, 
the Spanish government accommodated it with a swift change of the 
legal requirements. Over 2,700 companies have moved their place of 
legal registration out of Catalonia between the October 1st referendum 
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and the end of November 2017. About 1,000 have also changed their 
fiscal domicile to other parts of Spain. They feared the legal and political 
uncertainty, the loss of markets, deposit withdrawals, and speculation 
against their shares. While the immediate fiscal loss of this exodus might 
be limited in the short run, investments and jobs will follow over time if 
this process is not reversed. 
Secessionists sought to belittle the impact, saying it would only amount 
to a legal procedure, while productive capacities would remain in 
Catalonia. Yet the reputation loss hurts investments and companies 
typically contract the most value added inputs such as legal, technical, 
and creative services at the places where their headquarters are located. 
Nobody would consider Apple a company from China, just because the 
iPhone is produced there. Many in Barcelona now fear the possibility 
of a “Montreal effect”, i.e., the loss of economic dynamism that 
Canada’s erstwhile economic centre suffered over the decades following 
independence agitation in Quebec. In another economic counter-
secession move the federal government in Madrid has tried to alleviate 
such fears during the campaign for the Catalan elections on December 
21st 2017 with the prospect of tax breaks for companies that relocate 
back to Catalonia. The promised fiscal gains of secession and the 
underlying statistical misinformation look increasingly dubious (Borrell 
and Llorach, 2015). Expectations of a smooth and economically painless 
road towards secession were widespread in Catalonia before October 
2017. They have proven to be misguided. 
Conclusion
Economics play a major role in counter-secession strategies. Negative 
sanctions such as blockades and boycotts rank less prominently today 
than in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Brutal suppression and famine 
during the British campaign against the independence of India would be 
difficult to justify and maintain in today’s international environment. The 
same is true for a naval blockade that Unionist forces imposed on the 
south during the American civil war. 
Positive economic incentives such as trade deals, prestige projects, and 
reconstruction have become more important. This is particularly true for 
the EU, with its large common market, pooled bureaucratic capacities, 
and transfer payments. Negative repercussions of an EU exit affect 
secession calculations. Rather than being the enabler of secessionist 
forces, the EU has become their cage. 
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In 1945, there were 74 independent countries. Today there are 195. The breakup of colonial empires, 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and various secessions all over the world have led to the creation 
of numerous new sovereign states since World War II. Historically, the expansion and contraction 
of states has resulted from the competition between two living forces: secessionism and counter-
secessionism. Secession is the “detachment of a territory from an existing state with the aim of 
creating a new state on the detached territory”. By contrast, counter-secession could be defined 
as an attempt to prevent the break-up of states as well as their recognition by other states at the 
international level. Movements of secession and counter-secession compete and frequently clash 
over the formation of new states and one of the goals of this book is to understand the strategies of 
actors in favour of changing political borders as well as the reactions of those who want to prevent 
the break-up of states.
